Hans M. Kristensen,Matt Korda &Eliana Johns

Published online: 10 Sep 2023

汉斯 M.克里斯滕森，马特·科尔达和伊莉亚娜·约翰斯

在线发布：2023年9月10日

 

ABSTRACT

摘要

 

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research fellow Matt Korda, and research associate Eliana Johns. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column examines Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which we estimate to currently include approximately 170 warheads and which could realistically grow to around 200 by 2025 at the current growth rate. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-risk/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/.

《核笔记本》是由美国科学家联合会核信息项目的工作人员研究和撰写的：主任汉斯·m·克里斯滕森、高级研究员马特·科尔达和研究助理埃利亚娜·约翰斯。核笔记本专栏自1987年以来一直发表在《原子科学家公报》上。本期的专栏探讨了巴基斯坦的核武库，我们估计目前包括大约170枚弹头，按照目前的增长率，到2025年，核弹头实际可能增长到200枚左右。要查看所有以前的核笔记本列，请访问https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-risk/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/.

 

KEYWORDS: Pakistanballistic missilescruise missilesdelivery systemsnuclear weaponsnuclear notebook

关键词：巴基斯坦 弹道导弹 巡航导弹 发射系统 核武器 核笔记本

 

Pakistan continues to gradually expand its nuclear arsenal with more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing fissile material production industry. Analysis of commercial satellite images of construction at Pakistani army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be newer launchers and facilities that might be related to Pakistan's nuclear forces.

巴基斯坦继续逐步扩大其核武库，拥有更多的弹头、更多的运载系统和不断增长的裂变材料生产工业。对巴基斯坦陆军驻军和空军基地建筑的商业卫星图像的分析显示，似乎有一些新的发射器和设施可能与巴基斯坦核力量有关。

 

We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of approximately 170 warheads (See Table 1). The US Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020 (US Defense Intelligence Agency Citation1999, 38), but several new weapon systems have been fielded and developed since then, which leads us to a higher estimate. Our estimate comes with considerable uncertainty because neither Pakistan nor other countries publish much information about the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

我们估计，巴基斯坦目前拥有大约170枚核弹头的核武器库存（见表1）。美国国防情报局在1999年预测，到2020年，巴基斯坦将拥有60至80枚弹头（美国国防情报机构引文1999，38），但自那时以来，已经部署和开发了几种新的武器系统，这使我们得出了更高的估计。我们的估计带有相当大的不确定性，因为巴基斯坦和其他国家都没有公布太多关于巴基斯坦核武库的信息。

 

Table 1. Pakistani nuclear forces, 2023.

表1。巴基斯坦核力量，2023年。

 

With several new delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and an expanding uranium enrichment infrastructure, Pakistan’s stockpile has the potential to increase further over the next several years. The size of this projected increase will depend on several factors, including how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, how its nuclear strategy evolves, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. We estimate that the country’s stockpile could potentially grow to around 200 warheads by the late 2020s, at the current growth rate. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed.

随着几种新的运载系统的开发、四座钚生产反应堆和不断扩大的铀浓缩基础设施，巴基斯坦的库存有可能在未来几年进一步增加。预计增加的规模将取决于几个因素，包括巴基斯坦计划部署多少具有核能力的发射器，其核战略如何演变，以及印度核武库的增长程度。我们估计，按照目前的增长速度，到2020年末，该国的核弹头库存可能会增长到200枚左右。但是，除非印度大幅扩大其核武库或进一步加强其常规力量，否则巴基斯坦的核武库不会无限期地继续增长，而是可能随着其当前武器计划的完成而开始趋于平稳。

 

Research methodology and confidence

研究方法和信心

 

The estimates and analyses made in the Nuclear Notebook are derived from a combination of open sources: (1) state-originating data (e.g. government statements, declassified documents, budgetary information, military parades, and treaty disclosure data); (2) non-state-originating data (e.g. media reports, think tank analysis, and industry publications); and (3) commercial satellite imagery. Because each one of these sources provides different and limited information that is subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, we cross-check each data point by using multiple sources and supplementing them with private conversations with officials whenever possible.

核笔记本中的估计和分析来源于公开来源的组合：（1）源自国家的数据（如政府声明、解密文件、预算信息、阅兵式和条约披露数据）；（2） 非国家来源的数据（如媒体报道、智库分析和行业出版物）；和（3）商业卫星图像。由于这些来源中的每一个都提供了不同且有限的信息，这些信息具有不同程度的不确定性，我们通过使用多个来源对每个数据点进行交叉检查，并尽可能通过与官员的私人对话进行补充。

 

Analyzing Pakistan’s nuclear forces is particularly fraught with uncertainty, given the lack of official state-originating data. The Pakistani government has never publicly disclosed the size of its arsenal and does not typically comment on its nuclear doctrine. Unlike some other nuclear-armed states, Pakistan does not regularly publish any official documentation explaining the contours of its nuclear posture or doctrine. Whenever such details emerge in the public discourse, it usually originates from retired officials commenting in their personal capacities. The most regular official source on Pakistani nuclear weapons is the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces, which publishes regular press releases for missile launches and occasionally couples them with launch videos.

对巴基斯坦核力量的分析尤其充满了不确定性，因为它缺乏官方的国家原始数据。巴基斯坦政府从未公开披露其核武库的规模，也不会对其核原则发表评论。与其他一些拥有核武器的国家不同，巴基斯坦不定期发布任何官方文件来解释其核姿态或原则的轮廓。每当这些细节出现在公共话语中，通常来自退休官员以个人身份进行评论。关于巴基斯坦核武器最常见的官方来源是三军公共关系部（ISPR），这是巴基斯坦武装部队的媒体部门，定期发布导弹发射新闻稿，偶尔与发射视频相结合。

 

Occasionally, other countries offer official statements or analysis about Pakistan’s nuclear forces. For example, the US Air Force’s ballistic and cruise missile threat reports include analyses of Pakistani missile forces. As Pakistan’s regional competitor, Indian officials also occasionally make statements about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, although such statements must be taken with a grain of salt as they are often politically motivated. Similarly, Indian media sources often either exaggerate or minimize the characteristics of Pakistan’s arsenal, depending on the desired effect and audience. Pakistani media is also prone to frequent embellishment when describing the country’s arsenal. There are very few publications that researchers can turn to for reliable information about Pakistan’s nuclear forces and every rumor must be carefully investigated.

偶尔，其他国家会提供关于巴基斯坦核力量的官方声明或分析。例如，美国空军的弹道导弹和巡航导弹威胁报告包括对巴基斯坦导弹部队的分析。作为巴基斯坦的地区竞争对手，印度官员偶尔也会就巴基斯坦的核武器发表声明，尽管这些声明必须持谨慎态度，因为它们往往是出于政治动机。同样，印度媒体来源往往夸大或最小化巴基斯坦军火库的特点，这取决于所需的效果和受众。巴基斯坦媒体在描述该国的军火库时也经常添油加醋。研究人员很少能从出版物中获得有关巴基斯坦核力量的可靠信息，每一个谣言都必须仔细调查。

 

Given the absence of reliable data, commercial satellite imagery has become a particularly critical resource for analyzing Pakistan’s nuclear forces. Satellite imagery makes it possible to identify air, missile, and navy bases, as well as potential underground storage facilities. The greatest challenge of analyzing Pakistani nuclear forces with satellite imagery is the lack of reliable data with which to cross-check information revealed by images, particularly with regards to whether certain military bases are associated with nuclear or conventional strike missions, or both.

由于缺乏可靠的数据，商业卫星图像已成为分析巴基斯坦核力量的一个特别重要的资源。卫星图像可以识别空军、导弹和海军基地，以及潜在的地下储存设施。用卫星图像分析巴基斯坦核力量的最大挑战是缺乏可靠的数据来交叉检查图像显示的信息，特别是关于某些军事基地是否与核打击任务或常规打击任务有关，或两者兼有。

 

Overall, the lack of accurate data about Pakistan’s nuclear forces results in a lower degree of confidence in this Nuclear Notebook issue’s estimates relative to those of most other nuclear-armed countries.

总的来说，与大多数其他拥有核武器的国家相比，由于缺乏有关巴基斯坦核力量的准确数据，人们对本期《核笔记本》的估计值的信心较低。

 

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine

巴基斯坦的核学说

 

Within its broader philosophy of “credible minimum deterrence,” which seeks to emphasize a defensive and limited nuclear posture, Pakistan operates under a nuclear doctrine that it calls “full spectrum deterrence.” This posture is aimed mainly at deterring India, which Pakistan identifies as its primary adversary. The belief that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been deterring India since the mid-1980s has solidified the value of nuclear weapons in the nation’s security calculus (Kidwai Citation2020, 2).

在其更广泛的“可信的最低威慑”哲学中，巴基斯坦试图强调防御性和有限的核态势，它在一种被称为“全谱威慑”的核理论下运作。这种态势主要旨在威慑巴基斯坦认为是其主要对手的印度。自20世纪80年代中期以来，巴基斯坦的核武器一直在威慑印度，这一信念巩固了核武器在国家安全考量中的价值（基德瓦伊 引文2020，2）。

 

In May 2023, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Khalid Kidwai—an advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which oversees nuclear weapons development, doctrine, and employment—gave a speech at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) where he offered his description of what “full spectrum deterrence” entails. According to Kidwai (Citation2023), “full spectrum deterrence” implies the following:

2023年5月，负责监督核武器开发、条令和使用的巴基斯坦国家指挥局顾问哈立德·基德瓦伊中将在伊斯兰堡战略研究所发表演讲，描述了“全谱威慑”的含义。根据基德瓦伊（引文2023），“全谱威慑”意味着以下内容：

 

“That Pakistan possesses the full spectrum of nuclear weapons in three categories: strategic, operational and tactical, with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass and its outlying territories; there is no place for India’s strategic weapons to hide.

“巴基斯坦拥有三类全方位核武器：战略、作战和战术核武器，全方位覆盖印度大片土地及其外围领土；印度的战略武器无处藏身。

 

That Pakistan possesses an entire range of weapons yield coverage in terms of kilotons (KT), and the numbers strongly secured, to deter the adversary’s declared policy of massive retaliation; Pakistan’s “counter-massive retaliation” can therefore be as severe if not more.

巴基斯坦拥有以千吨（KT）为单位的全系列武器产量覆盖范围，并且数量得到了有力保障，以阻止对手宣布的大规模报复政策；因此，巴基斯坦的“反大规模报复”可能同样严厉，甚至更严厉。

 

That Pakistan retains the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a “target-rich India,” notwithstanding the indigenous Indian BMD or the Russian S-400, to include counter value, counter force and battlefield targets.”

巴基斯坦保留从“目标丰富的印度”的全方位目标中选择的自由，尽管印度本土BMD或俄罗斯S-400，包括反价值、反力量和战场目标。”

 

According to Kidwai, who previously served as the director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), the “full spectrum” aspect of Pakistan’s deterrence posture encompasses both “horizontal” and “vertical” elements. The horizontal aspect refers to Pakistan’s nuclear “triad” encompassing the Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC), and the Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC). The vertical aspect refers to three tiers of destructive yield—“strategic, operational, and tactical”—as well as a range coverage “from zero meters to 2750 kilometers,” allowing Pakistan to target the entirety of India (Kidwai Citation2023).

基德瓦伊曾担任战略计划司司长，他表示，巴基斯坦威慑态势的“全方位”包括“横向”和“纵向”因素。横向是指巴基斯坦的核“三位一体”，包括陆军战略部队司令部（ASFC）、海军战略力量司令部（NSFC）和空军战略司令部（AFSC）。垂直方面指的是三层破坏性当量——“战略、作战和战术”——以及“从0米到2750公里”的射程，使巴基斯坦能够瞄准整个印度（基德瓦伊 引文2023）。

 

Kidwai and other former Pakistani officials have explained that this posture—as well as Pakistan’s particular emphasis on non-strategic nuclear weapons—is specifically intended as a response to a perceived India’s “cold start” doctrine (Kidwai Citation2020). The “cold start” doctrine is an alleged intention by India to launch large-scale conventional strikes or incursions into Pakistani territory without triggering Pakistani nuclear retaliation. Pakistan has reacted to this perceived doctrine by adding several short-range, lower-yield nuclear-capable weapon systems specifically designed to counter military threats below the strategic level.

基德瓦伊和其他巴基斯坦前官员解释说，这种姿态——以及巴基斯坦对非战略核武器的特别重视——是为了回应印度的“冷启动”理论（基德瓦伊引文2020）。所谓“冷启动”理论，是指印度有意在不引发巴基斯坦核报复的情况下对巴基斯坦领土发动大规模常规打击或入侵。巴基斯坦对这一理论作出了反应，增加了几个短程、低当量核武器系统，专门用于应对战略层面以下的军事威胁。

 

An example of such a low-yield, close-range nuclear capability is Pakistan’s Nasr (also known as Hatf-9) ballistic missile. In 2015, Kidwai stated that the Nasr was specifically “born out of a compulsion of this thing that I mentioned about some people on the other side toying with the idea of finding space for conventional war, despite Pakistan[’s] nuclear weapons” (Kidwai Citation2015). According to Kidwai, Pakistan’s understanding of India’s “cold start” strategy was that Delhi envisioned launching quick strikes into Pakistan within two to four days with eight to nine brigades simultaneously: an attack force which would involve roughly 32,000 to 36,000 troops. “I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s inventory, and in the strategic stability debate, we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side,” Kidwai (Citation2015) explained.

这种低当量、近距离核能力的一个例子是巴基斯坦的“纳斯尔”（也称为哈塔夫-9）弹道导弹。2015年，基德瓦伊表示，“纳斯尔”特别“源于我提到的另一方的一些人不顾巴基斯坦的核武器，玩弄为常规战争寻找空间的想法”（基德瓦伊 引文2015）。基德瓦伊表示，巴基斯坦对印度“冷启动”战略的理解是，德里设想在两到四天内同时向巴基斯坦发动八到九个旅的快速打击：一支约有32000到36000名士兵的攻击部队。基德瓦伊（引文2015）解释道：“我坚信，通过在巴基斯坦的库存中引入各种战术核武器，以及在战略稳定辩论中，我们阻断了另一方采取严肃军事行动的途径。”。

 

After Kidwai’s (Citation2015) statement, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry publicly acknowledged the existence of Pakistan’s “low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons,” apparently the first time a top government official had done so (India Today Citation2015). At the time, the tactical missiles had not yet been deployed but their purpose was further explained by Pakistani defense minister Khawaja M. Asif in an interview with Geo News in September 2016: “We are always pressurized [sic] time and again that our tactical (nuclear) weapons, in which we have a superiority, that we have more tactical weapons than we need. It is internationally recognized that we have a superiority and if there is a threat to our security or if anyone steps on our soil and if someone’s designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those weapons for our defense” (Scroll Citation2016). In developing its nonstrategic nuclear strategy, one study has asserted that Pakistan to some extent has emulated NATO’s flexible response strategy without necessarily understanding how it would work (Tasleem and Dalton Citation2019).

基德瓦伊（引文2015）发表声明后，巴基斯坦外交大臣伊扎兹·乔杜里公开承认巴基斯坦存在“低当量战术核武器”，这显然是政府高级官员首次这样做（《今日印度 引文2015》）。当时，战术导弹尚未部署，但巴基斯坦国防部长卡瓦贾·M进一步解释了其用途。阿西夫在2016年9月接受《地理新闻》采访时表示：“我们总是一次又一次地受到压力，因为我们的战术（核）武器，我们在其中具有优势，我们拥有比我们需要的更多的战术武器。国际公认，我们拥有优势，如果我们的安全受到威胁，或者有人踏上我们的土地，如果有人的设计威胁到我们的安全，我们将毫不犹豫地使用这些武器进行防御”（滚动 引文2016）。在制定其非战略核战略时，一项研究断言，巴基斯坦在某种程度上模仿了北约的灵活应对战略，而不一定了解它将如何运作（塔斯琳和道尔顿 引文2019）。

 

Pakistan’s nuclear posture—particularly its development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons—has created considerable concern in other countries, including the United States, which fears that it increases the risk of escalation and lowers the threshold for nuclear use in a military conflict with India. Over the past decade-and-a-half, the US assessment of nuclear weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed considerably from confidence to concern, particularly because of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2007, a US State Department official told Congress that, “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise” (Boucher Citation2007). After the emergence of tactical nuclear weapons, the Obama administration changed the tune: “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you’re taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure,” as then US Undersecretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told Congress in 2016 (Economic Times Citation2016).

巴基斯坦的核态势，特别是其战术核武器的开发和部署，在包括美国在内的其他国家引起了相当大的担忧，美国担心这会增加升级的风险，并降低在与印度的军事冲突中使用核武器的门槛。在过去的十五年里，美国对巴基斯坦核武器安全的评估似乎发生了很大变化，从信任变成了担忧，特别是因为战术核武器的引入。2007年，一位美国国务院官员告诉国会，“我认为，我们相当有信心，他们有适当的结构和保障措施，以保持其核力量的完整性，不允许任何妥协”（布歇 引文，2007年）。战术核武器出现后，奥巴马政府改变了论调：正如时任美国副国务卿罗丝•高特莫勒在2016年告诉国会的那样（《经济时报》引文2016），“战场核武器从本质上来说，构成了安全威胁，因为你把战场核武器带到了一个不安全的地方，正如你所知，这是必要的。”

 

The Trump administration echoed this assessment in 2018: “We are particularly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use in battlefield. We believe that these systems are more susceptible to terrorist theft and increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange in the region” (Economic Times Citation2017). The Trump administration’s South Asia strategy in 2017 urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, notably to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists” (The White House Citation2017).

特朗普政府在2018年回应了这一评估：“我们特别关注设计用于战场的战术核武器的发展。我们认为，这些系统更容易受到恐怖分子盗窃的影响，并增加了该地区核交火的可能性”（《经济时报》引文2017）。2017年，特朗普政府的南亚战略敦促巴基斯坦停止庇护恐怖组织，特别是“防止核武器和核材料落入恐怖分子手中”（白宫 引文2017）。

 

In the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment, US Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats said, “Pakistan continues to develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles,” noting that “the new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for escalation dynamics and security in the region” (Coats Citation2019, 10). The Defense Intelligence Agency appeared to tone down its language slightly in its 2021 and 2022 Worldwide Threat Assessments, stating that “Pakistan very likely will continue to modernize and expand its nuclear capabilities by conducting training with its deployed weapons and developing new delivery systems…” but not explicitly noting the inherent escalation risks (Berrier Citation2021; Citation2022, 50).”

在2019年全球威胁评估中，美国国家情报总监丹尼尔·R·科茨表示，“巴基斯坦继续发展新型核武器，包括短程战术武器、海基巡航导弹、空射巡航导弹和远程弹道导弹”，并指出“新型核武器将给该地区的升级动态和安全带来新的风险”（科茨 引文2019，10）。国防情报局在2021年和2022年的全球威胁评估中似乎略微淡化了措辞，声明“巴基斯坦很可能会继续通过对其部署的武器进行训练和开发新的运载系统来实现其核能力的现代化和扩大……”，但没有明确指出固有的升级风险（贝里尔 引文2021；引文2022，50）

 

Pakistani officials, for their part, reject such concerns. In 2021, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan stated that he was “not sure whether we’re growing [the nuclear arsenal] or not because as far as I know … the only one purpose [of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons] – it’s not an offensive thing.” He added that “Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is simply as a deterrent, to protect ourselves” (Laskar Citation2021).

巴基斯坦官员则拒绝接受这种担忧。2021年，时任总理伊姆兰·汗表示，他“不确定我们是否在发展[核武库]，因为据我所知……[巴基斯坦核武器]的唯一目的是——这不是一件冒犯性的事情。”他补充道，“巴基斯坦的核武库只是一种威慑，是为了保护我们自己”（拉斯卡尔 引文 2021）。

 

Nuclear security, decision-making, and crisis management

核安全、决策和危机管理

 

After years of highly-publicized US concerns over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons—including the Pentagon reportedly making contingency plans for their rendition in the event of a crisis—Pakistani officials have repeatedly challenged the notion that the security of their nuclear weapons is deficient (Goldberg and Ambinder Citation2011; MacAskill Citation2007). Samar Mubarik Mund, the former director of the country’s National Defense Complex, explained in 2013 that a Pakistani nuclear warhead is “assembled only at the eleventh hour if [it] needs to be launched. It is stored in three to four different parts at three to four different locations. If a nuclear weapon doesn’t need to be launched, then it is never available in assembled form” (World Bulletin Citation2013).

多年来，美国对巴基斯坦核武器安全的担忧，据报道包括五角大楼制定应急计划，巴基斯坦官员一再质疑他们的核武器安全不足的观点（戈德堡和安宾德 引文2011；麦卡斯基尔 引文2007）。该国国防综合大楼前主任萨马尔·穆巴拉克·曼德在2013年解释说，巴基斯坦的核弹头“在需要发射时只能最后时刻组装”。它被储存在三到四个不同的部分，在三到四个不同的位置。如果一种核武器不需要发射，那么它就永远不会以组装的形式获得”（世界公报 引文2013）。

 

Despite Pakistan’s recent upgrades to the security of its military bases and facilities, at a Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee reception in October 2022, US President Joe Biden commented that Pakistan was “one of the most dangerous nations in the world” due to the lack of “cohesion” in its nuclear security and command and control procedures—a comment that Pakistan quickly and forcefully rebuked (Khan Citation2022).

尽管巴基斯坦最近对其军事基地和设施的安全进行了升级，但在2022年10月的民主党国会竞选委员会招待会上，美国总统乔·拜登评论说，巴基斯坦是“世界上最危险的国家之一”，因为其核安全、指挥和控制程序缺乏“凝聚力”——巴基斯坦迅速强烈谴责了这一评论（汗 引文 2022）。

 

Nuclear policy and operational decision-making in Pakistan are undertaken by the National Command Authority, which is chaired by the prime minister and includes both high-ranking military and civilian officials. The primary nuclear-related body within the National Command Authority is the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which has been described by the former Director of the SPD’s Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs as “a unique organization that is incomparable to any other nuclear-armed state. From operational planning, weapon development, storage, budgets, arms control, diplomacy, and policies related to civilian applications for energy, agriculture, and medicine, etc., all are directed and controlled by SPD.” Additionally, SPD “is responsible for nuclear policy, strategy and doctrines. It formulates force development strategy for the tri-services strategic forces, operational planning at the joint services level, and controls movements and deployments of all nuclear forces. SPD implements NCA’s employment decisions for nuclear use through its NC3 systems” (Khan, F. H. Citation2019).

巴基斯坦的核政策和行动决策由国家指挥局（NCA）负责，该机构由总理担任主席，包括高级军事和文职官员。国家指挥局的主要核相关机构是战略计划司（SPD），前SPD军备控制和裁军事务主任将其描述为“这是一个独一无二的组织，是任何其他拥有核武器的国家都无法比拟的。从作战规划、武器开发、储存、预算、军备控制、外交，到与能源、农业和医学等民用应用相关的政策，所有这些都由SPD领导和控制。”此外，SPD“负责核政策、战略和理论。它为三军战略部队制定部队发展战略，制定联合军种层面的作战规划，并控制所有核部队的行动和部署。SPD通过其核指挥控制通信(NC3)系统执行国家指挥局（NCA）的核使用决策”（汗，F.H.引文 2019）。

 

The National Command Authority was convened after India and Pakistan engaged in open hostilities in February 2019, when Indian fighters dropped bombs near the Pakistani town of Balakot in response to a suicide bombing conducted by a Pakistan-based militant group. In retaliation, Pakistani aircraft shot down and captured an Indian pilot before returning him a week later and convened the National Command Authority. Following the meeting, a senior Pakistani official gave what appeared to be a thinly veiled nuclear threat: “I hope you know what the [National Command Authority] means and what it constitutes. I said that we will surprise you. Wait for that surprise. … You have chosen a path of war without knowing the consequence for the peace and security of the region” (Abbasi Citation2019). In his memoir published in January 2023, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo mentioned the February 2019 crisis saying that India and Pakistan came “close” to a “nuclear conflagration” (Biswas Citation2023).

2019年2月，印度和巴基斯坦展开公开敌对行动，印度武装分子在巴基斯坦巴拉科特镇附近投掷炸弹，以回应巴基斯坦激进组织的自杀式炸弹袭击。作为报复，巴基斯坦飞机击落并俘获了一名印度飞行员，一周后将他归还，并召集了国家指挥局。会议结束后，一名巴基斯坦高级官员提出了一个似乎毫不加掩饰的核威胁：“我希望你们知道[国家指挥局]的含义以及它的构成。，我说过我们会给你一个惊喜的。一直在等待那个惊喜。……你选择了一条不知道对该地区和平与安全的影响的战争道路”（阿巴西 引文2019）。在2023年1月出版的回忆录中，美国前国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥提到了2019年2月的危机，称印度和巴基斯坦“接近”一场“核大火”（比斯瓦斯 引文2023）。

 

On March 9, 2022, India accidentally launched a BrahMos cruise missile, which crossed the border into Pakistan and traveled approximately 124 kilometers before crashing near the town of Mian Channu (Korda Citation2022). This was an extremely rare occurrence of a nuclear-armed country launching a missile into the territory of another nuclear power. A subsequent Indian inquiry found that the incident resulted from a deviation from standard operation procedures during a “routine maintenance and inspection” exercise. India made a public statement announcing these findings and terminated the three responsible Indian Air Force officers. However, Pakistan was not satisfied and rejected India’s “purported closure of the highly irresponsible incident,” insisting on a joint probe into the circumstances of the accident (Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Citation2022). A year after the incident, on March 10, 2023, Pakistan reiterated its standing request for a joint investigation, citing concern about the reliability of India’s command and control systems (Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Citation2023).

2022年3月9日，印度意外发射了一枚布拉莫斯巡航导弹，越过边境进入巴基斯坦，飞行了大约124公里，在棉查努镇附近坠毁（科达 引文2022年）。这是拥有核武器的国家向另一个核能的领土发射导弹的极其罕见的情况。随后的印度调查发现，该事件是由于在“例行维护和检查”过程中偏离标准操作程序造成的。印度公司发表了一份公开声明，宣布了这些发现，并解雇了三名负责任的印度空军军官。然而，巴基斯坦并不满意，拒绝了印度“声称结束这一高度不负责任的事件”，坚持对事故的情况进行联合调查（巴基斯坦外交部 引文2022年）。事件发生一年后，2023年3月10日，巴基斯坦重申了其要求进行联合调查的长期请求，理由是担心印度的指挥和控制系统的可靠性（巴基斯坦外交部 引文2023年）。

 

In addition to India’s opacity regarding the incident in the days immediately following the missile launch, it is notable that Pakistan may not have tracked the missile correctly during its flight. In a press conference following the missile launch, Pakistani military officials displayed a map showing their interpretation of the missile’s flight and noted that Pakistan’s “actions, response, everything … it was perfect. We detected it on time, and we took care of it” (ISPR Citation2022b). The flight path that Pakistan presented, however, included some discrepancies over where the missile had been launched, as well as its perceived target, and was publicly disputed by Indian sources (Korda Citation2022; Philip Citation2022).

除了印度在导弹发射后几天的事件上的不透明性外，值得注意的是，巴基斯坦在飞行过程中可能没有正确地跟踪导弹。在导弹发射后的新闻发布会上，巴基斯坦军方官员展示了一张地图，显示了他们对导弹飞行的解释，并指出巴基斯坦的“行动、反应，一切……这是完美的。我们及时检测到它，并处理了它”（ISPR 引文2022b）。然而，巴基斯坦提出的飞行路径包括导弹发射地点以及其感知的目标的一些差异，并被印度消息来源公开争议（科达 引文2022；菲利普 引文2022）。

 

According to one Indian news source, in the absence of clarification from India, Pakistan Air Force’s Air Defence Operations Centre immediately suspended all military and civilian aircraft for nearly six hours, and reportedly placed frontline bases and strike aircraft on high alert (Bhatt Citation2022; Philip Citation2022; Korda Citation2022; ISPR Citation2022c). Pakistan’s military sources stated that these bases remained on alert until 13:00 PKT on March 14th. (The Pakistan Standard Time (PKT) is typically 30 minutes behind of India Standard Time (IST).) Pakistani officials appeared to confirm this, noting that “whatever procedures were to start, whatever tactical actions had to be taken, they were taken” (ISPR Citation2022b).

据一位印度新闻来源称，在印度没有澄清的情况下，巴基斯坦空军防空作战中心立即暂停所有军用和民用飞机近六个小时，并据报道将前线基地和攻击机置于高度戒备状态（巴特 引文2022；菲利浦 引文2022；科达 引文2022；ISPR 引文2022c）。巴基斯坦军方消息人士称，这些基地一直处于戒备状态，直到3月14日下午13:00。（巴基斯坦标准时间（PKT）通常为落后印度标准时间（IST）30分钟。）巴基斯坦官员似乎证实了这一点，并指出“无论要启动什么程序，无论必须采取什么战术行动，都已采取”（ISPR 引文2022b）。

 

While the US Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center Ballistic and Cruise Missile Report lists India’s BrahMos missile as conventional, this incident could potentially have escalated had it taken place during a previous period of notoriously tense relations between the two nuclear-armed countries (National Air and Space Intelligence Center Citation2017, 37). Moreover, Pakistan and India do not have robust transparency and crisis management mechanisms: Since 1988, the two countries have annually exchanged an annual list of nuclear facilities, and there is a high-level military hotline between the two countries; however, Pakistani officials noted that during the seven minutes of the missile’s flight India did not use the hotline to alert Pakistan of the accidental launch (ISPR Citation2022b). The two countries’ initial responses to the incident suggest that regional crisis management mechanisms may not be as reliable as intended.

虽然美国空军国家航空航天情报中心弹道和巡航导弹报告将印度的布拉莫斯导弹列为常规导弹，但如果这起事件发生在这两个拥有核武器的国家之间众所周知的紧张关系时期，则可能会升级（国家航空航天情报中心 引文2017，37）。此外，巴基斯坦和印度没有健全的透明度和危机管理机制：自1988年以来，两国每年交换一份核设施年度清单，两国之间有一条高级军事热线；然而，巴基斯坦官员指出，在导弹飞行的七分钟内，印度没有使用热线提醒巴基斯坦发生意外发射（ISPR 引文2022b）。两国对该事件的初步反应表明，区域危机管理机制可能不如预期的那样可靠。

 

Fissile materials production and inventory

裂变材料生产和库存

 

Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding. It includes the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant east of Islamabad, which appears to be growing with the near-completion of what could be another enrichment plant, as well as the enrichment plant at Gadwal to the north of Islamabad (Albright, Burkhard, and Pabian Citation2018). Four heavy-water plutonium production reactors appear to have been completed at what is normally referred to as the Khushab Complex some 33 kilometers south of Khushab in Punjab province. Three of the reactors at the complex have been added in the past 10 years. The addition of a publicly confirmed thermal power plant at Khushab provides new information for estimating the power of the four reactors (Albright et al. Citation2018).

巴基斯坦有一个成熟和多样化的裂变材料生产综合体，该综合体正在扩大。其中包括伊斯兰堡东部的卡胡塔铀浓缩厂，该厂似乎正在随着另一个浓缩厂的接近完工而发展，以及伊斯兰堡北部加德瓦尔的浓缩厂（奥尔布赖特、布尔哈尔德和巴比安 引文2018）。四座重水钚生产反应堆似乎已经在旁遮普省库沙布以南约33公里的胡沙卜综合设施完工。在过去的10年里，该综合体增加了三个反应堆。在库沙布增加一个公开确认的火力发电厂为估计四个反应堆的功率提供了新的信息（奥尔布赖特等人，引文2018）。

 

The New Labs Reprocessing Plant at Nilore, east of Islamabad, which reprocesses spent fuel and extracts plutonium, has been expanded. Meanwhile, a second reprocessing plant located at Chashma in the northwestern part of Punjab province may have been completed and become operational by 2015 (Albright and Kelleher-Vergantini Citation2015). A significant expansion to the Chashma complex was under construction between 2018 and 2020, although it remains unclear whether the reprocessing plant continued to operate throughout that period (Hyatt and Burkhard Citation2020). In June 2023, China and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a $4.8 billion deal to construct a new 1,200-megawatt reactor at Chashma (Shahzad Citation2023).

位于伊斯兰堡东部尼洛尔的新实验室再处理工厂已经扩大，该工厂负责对乏燃料进行再处理和提取钚。与此同时，位于旁遮普省西北部查什马的第二个再处理工厂可能已经完成，并于2015年投入使用（奥尔布莱特和凯莱赫-维尔甘蒂尼 引用2015年）。在2018年至2020年期间，该工厂正在进行重大扩建，尽管目前尚不清楚再处理厂是否在此期间继续运营（凯悦和伯克哈德 引用2020年）。于2023年6月，中国和巴基斯坦签署了一份谅解备忘录（MOU），将斥资48亿美元在查什马建造一个新的1200兆瓦的反应堆（沙赫扎德 引用2023）。

 

Nuclear-capable missiles and their mobile launchers are developed and produced at the National Defence Complex (sometimes called the National Development Complex) located in the Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range west of Islamabad. The complex is divided into two sections. The western section south of Attock appears to be involved in development, production, and test-launching of missiles and rocket engines. The eastern section north of Fateh Jang is involved in production and assembly of road-mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs), which are designed to transport and fire missiles. Satellite images regularly show the presence of TEL chassis for a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles: In June 2023, TEL chassis were visible for Nasr, Shaheen-IA ballistic missiles, and Babur cruise missiles (Figure 1). The Fateh Jang section has expanded significantly with several new launcher assembly buildings over the past 10 years, and the complex continues to expand. Other launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.

具有核能力的导弹及其移动发射器是在位于伊斯兰堡西部卡拉奇塔达尔山脉的国防综合体（有时称为国家发展综合体）开发和生产的。该建筑群分为两部分。阿托克以南的西部地区似乎参与了导弹和火箭发动机的开发、生产和试射。法塔赫姜(Fateh Jang)以北的东部地区参与了道路移动运输竖立发射器（TEL）的生产和组装，该发射器旨在运输和发射导弹。卫星图像定期显示各种弹道导弹和巡航导弹的TEL底盘：2023年6月，“纳斯尔”、沙欣 IA弹道导弹和巴布尔巡航导弹的TEL底盘可见（图1）。在过去的10年里，法塔赫姜段进行了大幅扩建，新建了几座发射器组装大楼 多年来，该建筑群不断扩大。其他与发射器和导弹相关的生产和维护设施可能位于塔尔纳瓦和塔克西拉附近。

 

图1。法塔赫姜附近扩建的国家发展中心可见巴基斯坦导弹TEL。（图片：Maxar技术公司/美国科学家联合会）。

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Little is publicly known about warhead production, but experts have suspected for many years that the Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, northwest of Islamabad, serve a role. One of the Wah factories is located near a unique facility with six earth-covered bunkers (igloos) inside a multi-layered safety perimeter with armed guards.

关于弹头生产，公众知之甚少，但多年来，专家们一直怀疑伊斯兰堡西北部瓦赫附近的巴基斯坦军械厂发挥了作用。瓦赫的一家工厂位于一个独特的设施附近，该设施内有六个覆土掩体（圆顶建筑），多层安全围栏内有武装警卫。

 

A frequent oversimplification for estimating the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons is to derive the estimate directly from the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced. As of the beginning of 2023, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 4,900 kilograms (plus or minus 1,500 kilograms) of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 500 kilograms (plus or minus 170 kilograms) of weapon-grade plutonium (Kütt, Mian, and Podvig Citation2023). Assuming each first-generation implosion-type warhead’s solid core uses 15 to 18 kilograms (kg) of weapon-grade HEU or 5 to 6 kg of plutonium, this fissile material would theoretically be enough to produce a maximum of approximately 188 to 436 HEU-based single-stage warheads and 55 to 134 plutonium-based single-stage warheads if fully expended. However, Pakistan’s warhead designs may have undergone some iteration and have become more efficient.

估算巴基斯坦核武器数量的一个经常过于简单化的做法是，直接从生产的武器级裂变材料的数量得出估算值。截至2023年初，国际裂变材料小组估计，巴基斯坦的武器级（90%浓缩）高浓缩铀库存约为4900公斤（正负1500公斤），武器级钚库存约为500公斤（正负170公斤）（库特、米安和波德维格 引文2023）。假设每个第一代内爆型弹头的实心核使用15至18公斤（kg）的武器级高浓缩铀或5至6公斤或千克钚，如果完全消耗掉，这种裂变材料理论上足以生产最多约188至436枚高浓缩铀单级弹头和55至134枚钚单级弹头。然而，巴基斯坦的弹头设计可能经过了一些换代，变得更加高效。

 

It is important to note that calculating stockpile size based solely on fissile material inventory is an incomplete methodology that tends to overestimate the likely number of nuclear warheads. Instead, warhead estimates must take several other factors into account in addition to the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced, including the warhead design choice and efficiency, warhead production rates, number of operational nuclear-capable launchers, number of launchers with dual-capability, and nuclear doctrine.

值得注意的是，仅根据裂变材料库存计算库存规模是一种不完整的方法，往往会高估核弹头的可能数量。相反，除了生产的武器级裂变材料的数量外，弹头估计还必须考虑其他几个因素，包括弹头的设计选择和效率、弹头生产率、可操作的具有核能力的发射器的数量、具有双重能力的发射器数量和核理论。

 

Nuclear warheads estimates must assume that not all of Pakistan’s fissile material is used for weapons. Like other nuclear-armed countries, Pakistan most probably keeps some fissile material in reserve. Pakistan also does not have enough nuclear-capable launchers to accommodate several hundreds of warheads. Moreover, all of Pakistan’s launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means that some of them, especially the shorter-range systems, may serve non-nuclear missions. Finally, official statements often refer to “warheads” and “weapons” interchangeably, which leads to ambiguity as to whether they are referring to the number of launchers or the warheads being assigned to them.

核弹头估计必须假设并非所有巴基斯坦的裂变材料都用于武器。与其他拥有核武器的国家一样，巴基斯坦很可能保留了一些裂变材料储备。巴基斯坦也没有足够的具有核能力的发射器来容纳数百枚弹头。此外，巴基斯坦的所有发射器都被认为具有双重能力，这意味着其中一些发射器，特别是短程系统，可能用于非核任务。最后，官方声明经常交替提及“弹头”和“武器”，这导致它们是指发射器的数量还是指分配给它们的弹头的模糊性。

 

The amount of fissile material in warheads—and the size of the warhead—can be reduced, and their yield increased, by using tritium to “boost” the fission process. Pakistan’s tritium production capability is poorly understood due to a lack of reliable public information. One study in early 2021 estimated that Pakistan could have produced 690 grams of tritium by the end of 2020, sufficient to boost over 100 weapons. The study assessed that warheads produced for delivery by the Babur and Ra’ad cruise missiles and the Nasr and Abdali missiles almost certainly would require a small, lightweight tritium-boosted fission weapon (Jones Citation2021). If Pakistan has produced tritium and uses it in second-generation single-stage boosted warhead designs, then the estimated HEU and weapons-grade plutonium would potentially allow it to build a maximum of 283 to 533 HEU-based warheads and 66 to 167 plutonium-based warheads, assuming that each weapon used either 12 kg of HEU or 4 to 5 kg of plutonium.Footnote1 These calculations, however, produce results that are highly likely to be several hundred warheads more than Pakistan currently possesses, for the same reasons mentioned above.

通过使用氚“促进”裂变过程，可以减少弹头中裂变材料的数量和弹头的尺寸，并提高其产量。由于缺乏可靠的公共信息，人们对巴基斯坦的氚生产能力知之甚少。2021年初的一项研究估计，到2020年底，巴基斯坦可能生产690克氚，足以制造100多件武器。该研究评估称，“巴布尔”和“雷电”巡航导弹以及“纳斯尔”和“阿卜杜拉”导弹生产的弹头几乎肯定需要一种小型、轻型的氚助推裂变武器（琼斯 引文2021年）。如果巴基斯坦已经生产了氚，并将其用于第二代单级助推弹头设计，那么估计的高浓缩铀和武器级钚可能使其能够制造最多283至533枚高浓缩铀弹头和66至167枚钚弹头，假设每种武器使用12公斤高浓缩铀或4至5千克钚。脚注1 然而，出于上述相同原因，这些计算得出的结果极有可能比巴基斯坦目前拥有的弹头多几百枚。

 

We estimate that Pakistan currently is producing sufficient fissile material to build 14 to 27 new warheads per year, although we estimate that the actual warhead increase in the stockpile probably averages around 5 to 10 warheads per year.Footnote2

我们估计，巴基斯坦目前生产的裂变材料足以每年制造14至27枚新弹头，尽管我们估计，库存中弹头的实际增长可能平均每年约5至10枚。脚注2

 

Nuclear-capable aircraft and air-delivered weapons

具有核能力的飞机和空投武器

 

The aircraft most likely to have a nuclear delivery role are Pakistan’s Mirage III and Mirage V fighter squadrons. The Pakistani Air Force’s (PAF) Mirage fighter-bombers are located at two bases.Footnote3 Masroor Air Base outside Karachi houses the 32nd Wing with three Mirage squadrons: 7th Squadron (“Bandits”), 8th Squadron (“Haiders”), and 22nd Squadron (“Ghazis”). A possible nuclear weapons storage site is located five kilometers northwest of the base (Kristensen Citation2009) and, since 2004, highly guarded underground facilities have been constructed at Masroor that could potentially be designed to support a nuclear strike mission. This includes a possible alert hangar with underground weapons-handling capability.

最有可能发挥核运载作用的飞机是巴基斯坦的幻影III和幻影V战斗机中队。巴基斯坦空军的幻影战斗轰炸机位于两个基地。脚注3卡拉奇郊外的马斯鲁尔空军基地是第32联队的所在地，有三个幻影中队：第7中队（“土匪”）、第8中队（“海德尔”）和第22中队（“加齐斯”）。一个可能的核武器储存点位于基地西北五公里处（克里斯滕森 引文2009），自2004年以来，马斯鲁尔建造了高度戒备的地下设施，这些设施可能被设计成支持核打击任务。这包括一个可能具有地下武器处理能力的警戒机库。

 

The other Mirage base is Rafiqui Air Base near Shorkot, which is home to the 34th Wing with two Mirage squadrons: the 15th Squadron (“Cobras”) and the 27th Squadron (“Zarras”). On February 25, 2021, Pakistan’s President, Dr. Arif Alvi, visited the base for the ceremony of 50th Anniversary of Mirages and Colours Award, which displayed at least 11 Mirages (President of Pakistan Citation2021).

另一个幻影基地是绍尔科特附近的拉菲基空军基地，这里是第34联队的所在地，有两个幻影中队：第15中队（“眼镜蛇”）和第27中队（“扎拉斯”）。2021年2月25日，巴基斯坦总统阿里夫·阿尔维博士参观了该基地，参加了“幻影与色彩奖”50周年纪念仪式，该奖项展示了至少11架幻影（巴基斯坦总统 引文2021）。

 

The Mirage V is believed to have been given a strike role with Pakistan’ small arsenal of nuclear gravity bombs, while the Mirage III has been used for test launches of Pakistan’s Ra’ad air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), as well as the follow-on Ra’ad-II. The Pakistani Air Force has added an aerial refueling capability to the Mirage, a capability that would greatly enhance the nuclear strike mission (AFP Citation2018). Several of the Mirages displayed at the award ceremony at Rafiqui Air Base in 2021 appeared to be equipped with refueling pods.

据信，幻影V被巴基斯坦的小型核重力炸弹库赋予了打击作用，而幻影 III则被用于巴基斯坦的“雷电”空射巡航导弹（ALCM）的试射，以及拉阿德-II型的后续导弹。巴基斯坦空军为幻影增加了空中加油能力，这一能力将大大加强核打击任务（法新社 引用2018）。2021年在拉菲基空军基地举行的颁奖典礼上展出的几架幻影似乎配备了加油吊舱。

 

The air-launched, dual-capable Ra’ad ALCM is believed to have been test-launched at least six times, most recently in February 2016. The Pakistani government states that the Ra’ad “can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with great accuracy” (ISPR Citation2011a) to a range of 350 kilometers (km) and “complement[s] Pakistan’s deterrence capability” by achieving “strategic standoff capability on land and at sea” (ISPR Citation2016a). During a military parade in 2017, Pakistan displayed what was said to be Ra’ad-II ALCM, apparently an enhanced version of the original Ra’ad with a new engine air-intake and tail wing configuration (Khan Citation2017). The Pakistani government most recently tested the Ra’ad-II in February 2020 and stated that the missile can reportedly reach targets at a distance of 600 km (ISPR Citation2020a). All test launches involving either Ra’ad system have been conducted from Mirage III aircraft.

据信，空射双能力“雷电”(Ra'ad)空基巡航导弹至少进行了六次试射，最近一次是在2016年2月。巴基斯坦政府表示，“雷电”可以非常准确地将核弹头和常规弹头”（ISPR 引文2011a）发射到350公里的射程，并通过实现“陆地和海上战略对峙能力”（ISPR 引文2016a）“补充巴基斯坦的威慑能力”。在2017年的一次阅兵式上，巴基斯坦展示了据称是“雷电”-II空基巡航导弹（ALCM），显然是原始“雷电”的增强版，具有新的发动机进气口和尾翼配置（Khan Citation 2017）。巴基斯坦政府最近一次在2020年2月测试了“雷电”-II，并表示据报道该导弹可以到达600公里外的目标（ISPR 引文2020a）。所有涉及“雷电”系统的测试发射都是在幻影III飞机上进行的。

 

There is no available evidence to suggest that either Ra’ad system had been deployed as of July 2023; however, one potential deployment site could eventually be Masroor Air Base outside Karachi, which is home to several Mirage squadrons and includes unique underground facilities that might be associated with nuclear weapons storage and handling.

没有证据表明，截至2023年7月，“雷电”系统已经部署；然而，一个潜在的部署地点最终可能是卡拉奇郊外的马斯鲁尔空军基地，那里有几个幻影中队，包括可能与核武器储存和处理有关的独特地下设施。

 

To replace the PAF’s aging Mirage III and V aircraft, Pakistan has acquired more than 100 operational JF-17 aircraft—which are co-produced with China—and plans to acquire around another 188 JF-17s (Aamir Citation2022; Gady Citation2020; Quwa Citation2021; Warnes Citation2020). These aircraft are being continuously upgraded with new technology “blocks.” Pakistan reportedly inducted the first batch of 12 JF-17 Block III aircraft into the 16th (“Black Panthers”) squadron in March 2023 (Tiwari Citation2023). Several reports suggest that Pakistan may intend to incorporate the dual-capable Ra’ad ALCM onto the JF-17 so that the newer aircraft could eventually take over the nuclear strike role from the Mirage III/Vs (Ansari Citation2013; Fisher Citation2016; PakDefense Citation2020). In March 2023, during rehearsals for the 2023 Pakistan Day Parade (which was subsequently canceled), images surfaced of a JF-17 Thunder Block II carrying what resembled a Ra’ad-I ALCM, the first time such configuration was observed (Scramble Citation2023).

为了取代巴空军老化的幻影III和V飞机，巴基斯坦已经购买了100多架与中国共同生产的JF-17飞机，并计划购买大约188架JF-17（阿米尔 引文2022；盖迪 引文2020；夸瓦 引文2021；战争 引文2020）。这些飞机正在不断升级的新技术“批次”。据报道，巴基斯坦于2023年3月将第一批12架JF-17 Block III飞机引入第16（“黑豹”）中队（蒂瓦里 引文2023）。几份报告表明，巴基斯坦可能打算将双能力的“雷电” ALCM纳入JF-17，以便新飞机最终接管幻影III/V的核打击角色（安萨里 引文2013；费舍尔 引用2016；国防 引文2020）。2023年3月，在2023年巴基斯坦日游行的排练中（随后被取消），JF-17雷块II携带类似“雷电”-I ALCM，这是第一次观察到这样的配置（Scramble 引文2023）。

 

The nuclear capability of the PAF’s legacy F-16 aircraft is uncertain. Although Pakistan was obligated by its contract with the United States not to modify the aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, multiple credible reports subsequently emerged suggesting that Pakistan intended to do so (Associated Press Citation1989). In September 2022, the Biden administration agreed to a $450 million deal to help sustain Pakistan’s F-16 aircraft program (US Defense Security Cooperation Agency Citation2022).

巴基斯坦空军遗留的F-16战斗机的核能力尚不确定。尽管巴基斯坦根据其与美国的合同有义务不改装飞机以携带核武器，但随后出现了多份可信的报告，表明巴基斯坦打算这样做（美联社 引文1989年）。2022年9月，拜登政府同意了一项4.5亿美元的协议，以帮助维持巴基斯坦的F-16飞机项目（美国国防安全合作局 引文2022）。

 

The F-16A/Bs are based with the 38th Wing at Mushaf (formerly Sargodha) Air Base, located 160 kilometers northwest of Lahore in northeastern Pakistan. Organized into the 9th and 11th Squadrons (“Griffins” and “Arrows” respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1,600 km (extendable when equipped with drop tanks) and most likely are equipped to each carry a single nuclear bomb on the centerline pylon. If the F-16s have a nuclear strike mission, the nuclear gravity bombs attached to them most likely are not stored at the base itself but are potentially kept at the Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex, located 10 km to the south. In a crisis, the bombs could quickly be transferred to the base, or the F-16s could disperse to bases near underground storage facilities and receive the weapons there. Pakistan appears to be reinforcing the munitions bunkers, adding new tunnels, and installing extra security perimeters at the Sargodha complex.

F-16A/B的基地位于巴基斯坦东北部拉合尔西北160公里处的穆沙夫（前萨戈达）空军基地的第38联队。这些飞机分为第9和第11中队（分别为“狮鹫”和“箭”），射程为1600 公里（配备空投油箱时可延长），并且很可能配备在中心线挂架上各携带一枚核弹。如果F-16战斗机执行核打击任务，其上的核重力炸弹很可能不会储存在基地本身，而是可能存放在萨戈达武器储存中心，该中心位于10 南面公里处。在危机中，炸弹可以迅速转移到基地，或者F-16可以分散到地下储存设施附近的基地，在那里接收武器。巴基斯坦似乎正在加固弹药库，增加新的隧道，并在萨戈达建筑群安装额外的安全围栏。

 

The newer F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing at Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad in northern Pakistan. The wing upgraded to F-16C/Ds from Mirages in 2011 and, so far, has one squadron: the 5th Squadron (known as the “Falcons”). The base has undergone significant expansion, with numerous weapons bunkers added since 2004. As for the F-16A/Bs, if the base has a nuclear mission, the weapons attached to F-16C/Ds most probably are stored elsewhere in special storage facilities. Some F-16s are also visible at Minhas (Kamra) Air Base northwest of Islamabad, although these might be related to aircraft industry at the base. The F-16Cs were showcased in the 2022 Pakistan Day Parade.

较新的F-16C/D与第39联队驻扎在巴基斯坦北部雅各布巴德郊外的沙赫巴兹空军基地。2011年，该联队从幻影升级为F-16C/D，目前有一个中队：第五中队（被称为“猎鹰”）。该基地进行了重大扩建，自2004年以来增加了许多武器掩体。至于F-16A/B，如果基地有核任务，F-16C/D所附的武器很可能储存在特殊储存设施的其他地方。在伊斯兰堡西北部的卡姆拉-米哈斯(KAMRA-MINHAS)空军基地也可以看到一些F-16，尽管这些可能与基地的飞机工业有关。F-16C在2022年巴基斯坦日阅兵式上进行了展示。

 

Despite the reports about F-16s and the recent image of a Ra’ad ALCM loaded onto a JF-17, there are still too many uncertainties associated with these two aircraft to confidently attribute a dedicated nuclear strike role to either one. As a result, the PAF’s F-16s are omitted from Table 1 in this Nuclear Notebook, and the and JF-17s are listed with significant uncertainty.

尽管有关于F-16的报道和最近装载在JF-17上的“雷电”ALCM的图像，但这两类飞机仍有太多的不确定性，无法自信地将专门的核打击作用归因于其中任何一类。因此，本核笔记本的表1中省略了巴基斯坦空军的F-16战斗机，并列出了具有重大不确定性的JF-17战斗机。

 

Land-based ballistic missiles

陆基弹道导弹

 

Pakistan appears to have six currently operational nuclear-capable, solid-fuel, road-mobile ballistic missile systems: the short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-I/A (Hatf-4), and Nasr (Hatf-9), and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen-II (Hatf-6). Two other nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems are currently under development: the medium-range Shaheen-III and the MIRVed Ababeel. All of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable missiles—except for the Abdali, Ghauri, Shaheen-II, and Ababeel—were showcased at the Pakistan Day Parade in March 2021 (ISPR Citation2021g). The Nasr, Ghauri, Shaheen-IA and II, as well as the Babur-1A and Ra’ad-II were featured during the 2022 Pakistan Day Parade (ISPR Citation2022c).

巴基斯坦目前似乎有六个可运行的固体燃料核公路机动弹道导弹系统：短程“阿布达力”（哈塔夫-2）、加兹纳维（哈塔夫-3）、沙欣-I/A（哈塔夫-4）和纳斯尔（哈塔夫-9），以及中程高里（哈塔夫-5）和沙欣-II（哈塔夫-6）。另外两个具有核能力的弹道导弹系统目前正在开发中：中程沙欣III和多弹头独立再入飞行器(MIRV)“阿巴比尔”。2021年3月的巴基斯坦日阅兵式上展示了巴基斯坦的所有核导弹，但“阿布达力”、高里、沙欣 II和“阿巴比尔”除外（ISPR引文2021g）。纳斯尔、高里、沙欣 IA和II以及巴布尔-1A和雷电-II在2022年巴基斯坦日阅兵式上亮相（ISPR引文2022c）。

 

The Pakistani road-mobile ballistic missile force has undergone significant development and expansion over the past two decades. This includes possibly eight or nine missile garrisons, including four or five along the Indian border for short-range systems (Babur, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, Nasr) and three or four other garrisons further inland for medium-range systems (Shaheen-II and Ghauri).3 In 2022 and 2023, Pakistan conducted significantly fewer public missile test launches than in earlier years, which may be related to Pakistan’s ongoing political instability and countrywide protests following the ousting and subsequent arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in mid-2022.

巴基斯坦公路机动弹道导弹部队在过去二十年中经历了重大发展和扩张。这可能包括八到九个导弹驻军，包括印度边境的四到五个短程系统驻军（巴布尔、加兹纳维、沙欣-I、纳斯尔）和其他三到四个中程系统内陆驻军（沙欣-II和加乌里）。3 2022年和2023年，巴基斯坦进行的公开导弹试射明显少于前几年，这可能与2022年年中前总理伊姆兰·汗被赶下台并随后被捕后，巴基斯坦持续的政治不稳定和全国范围的抗议活动有关。

 

The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Abdali (Hatf-2) has been in development for a long time. The Pentagon reported in 1997 that the Abdali appeared to have been discontinued, but flight-testing resumed in 2002, and it was last reported test-launched in 2013. The 200 kilometer-range missile has been displayed at parades several times on a four-axle road-mobile transporter erector launcher (TEL). The gap in flight-testing indicates the Abdali program may have encountered technical difficulties. After the 2013 test, Inter Services Public Relations stated that Abdali “carries nuclear as well as conventional warheads” and “provides an operational-level capability to Pakistan’s Strategic Forces.” It said the test launch “consolidates Pakistan’s deterrence capability both at the operational and strategic levels” (ISPR Citation2013); however, the Abdali—Pakistan’s oldest ballistic missile type—has not been tested since 2013 and was not displayed at the Pakistan Day Parades of 2021 and 2022. This could potentially indicate that the missile has been superseded by newer systems.

短程固体燃料单级“阿布达力”（哈塔夫-2）已经开发了很长时间。五角大楼在1997年报告称，“阿布达力”似乎已经停产，但飞行测试在2002年恢复，最后一次测试是在2013年。这枚射程200公里的导弹曾多次在游行中展示在四轴公路机动运输架设发射器（TEL）上。飞行测试中的差距表明“阿布达力”项目可能遇到了技术困难。2013年试验后，三军公共关系部表示，“阿布达力”“携带核弹头和常规弹头”，并“为巴基斯坦战略部队提供作战级能力”。该部表示，此次试射“巩固了巴基斯坦在作战和战略层面的威慑能力”（ISPR 引文，2013年）；然而，巴基斯坦最古老的弹道导弹“阿布达力”自2013年以来就没有进行过测试，也没有在2021年和2022年的巴基斯坦日阅兵式上展出。这可能表明导弹已经被更新的系统所取代。

 

The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) was test-launched in 2019, 2020, and twice in 2021—its first reported test launches since 2014. In an important milestone for testing the readiness of Pakistan’s nuclear forces, the 2019 Ghaznavi launch was conducted at night. After each test, the Pakistani military stated that the Ghaznavi is “capable of delivering multiple types of warheads up to a range of 290 kilometers” (ISPR Citation2019c, Citation2020b, Citation2021b). Its short range means that the Ghaznavi cannot strike Delhi from Pakistani territory, and Army units equipped with the missile are probably based relatively near the Indian border (Kristensen Citation2016).

短程固体燃料单级“加兹纳维”（哈塔夫-3）于2019年、2020年和2021年进行了两次试射，这是自2014年以来首次报告的试射。在测试巴基斯坦核力量准备情况的一个重要里程碑中，2019年“加兹纳维”发射是在夜间进行的。每次测试后，巴基斯坦军方都表示，加兹纳维“能够将多种类型的弹头发射到290公里的射程内”（ISPR 引文2019c、引文2020b、引文2021b）。其射程较短意味着“加兹纳维”导弹无法从巴基斯坦领土上袭击德里，配备该导弹的陆军部队可能驻扎在相对靠近印度边境的地方（克里斯滕森 引文 2016）。

 

The Shaheen-I (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fuel, dual-capable, short-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of 650 km that has been in service since 2003. The Shaheen-I is carried on a four-axle, road-mobile TEL like the one used for the Ghaznavi. Since 2012, many Shaheen-I test launches have involved an extended-range version widely referred to as Shaheen-IA. The Pakistani government, which has declared the range of the Shaheen-IA to be 900 km, has used both designations. Pakistan most recently test launched the Shaheen-I in November 2019 and the Shaheen-IA in March and November 2021 (ISPR Citation2019d, Citation2021c, Citation2021d, Citation2021f). Potential Shaheen-1 deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil. The Shaheen-I was displayed at the 2021 Pakistan Day Parade, but it was replaced by the Shaheen-IA at the 2022 parade, indicating the latter system’s potential introduction into the armed forces (ISPR Citation2021g, Citation2022c).

沙欣-I（哈塔夫-4）是一种单级固体燃料双能短程弹道导弹，最大射程为650 公里，自2003年起投入使用。沙欣-I搭载在四轴公路机动起竖发射车辆上，与“加兹纳维”类似。自2012年以来，许多“沙欣-I”的测试发射都涉及一个被广泛称为“沙欣-IA”的增程版本。巴基斯坦政府宣布沙欣-IA的射程为900公里使用了这两种名称。巴基斯坦最近一次测试于2019年11月发射了沙欣-I，并于2021年3月和11月发射沙欣-IA（ISPR 引文2019d、引文2021c、引文2021d、引文2021f）。沙欣-1的潜在部署地点包括古兰瓦拉、奥卡拉和伯诺-阿吉尔。沙欣-I在2021年巴基斯坦日阅兵式上展出，但在2022年阅兵式上被沙欣-IA取代，这表明后一种系统有可能引入武装部队（ISPR 引文2021g，引文2022c）。

 

One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable missiles in the Pakistani arsenal is the Nasr (Hatf-9), a short-range, solid-fuel missile originally with a range of only 60 km that has recently been extended to 70 km (ISPR Citation2017c). However, its range being too short to attack strategic targets inside India, Nasr appears intended solely for battlefield defensive use against invading Indian troops.Footnote4 According to the Pakistani government, the Nasr “carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes” and was developed as a “quick response system” to “add deterrence value” to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development program “at shorter ranges to deter evolving threats,” including evidently India’s so-called Cold Start doctrine (ISPR Citation2011c, Citation2017a, 2017c). More recent tests of the Nasr system—including two tests in the same week in January 2019—sought to demonstrate the system’s salvo-launch capability, as well as the missiles’ in-flight maneuverability (ISPR Citation2019b, Citation2019d, Citation2019e).

巴基斯坦武器库中最具争议的新型核导弹之一是“纳斯尔”（哈塔夫-9），这是一种短程固体燃料导弹，最初的射程只有60公里最近延长到70公里（ISPR 引文2017c）。然而，“纳斯尔”的射程太短，无法攻击印度境内的战略目标，它似乎只用于对抗入侵的印度军队的战场防御。脚注4根据巴基斯坦政府的说法，纳斯尔“携带具有高精度、射击和机动属性的适当当量核弹头”，并被开发为一种“快速反应系统”，以“在较短距离内为巴基斯坦的战略武器开发计划“增加威慑价值”，以威慑不断演变的威胁”，显然包括印度所谓的冷启动理论（ISPR 引文2011c，引文2017a，2017c）。最近对“纳斯尔”系统的测试——包括2019年1月同一周的两次测试——试图证明该系统的齐射发射能力以及导弹的飞行机动性（ISPR 引文2019b、引文2019d和引文2019e）。

 

The Nasr’s four-axle, road-mobile TEL appears to use a snap-on system that can carry two or more launch-tube boxes, and the system has been tested in the past using a road-mobile quadruple box launcher. The US intelligence community has listed the Nasr as a deployed system since 2013 (National Air and Space Intelligence Center Citation2013), and with a total of 15 tests reported so far, the weapon system appears to be well-developed. Potential deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil.

“纳斯尔”的四轴公路移动TEL似乎使用了一个可携带两个或多个发射箱的快速系统，该系统过去曾使用公路机动四箱发射器进行过测试。自2013年以来，美国情报界已将“纳斯尔”列为已部署系统（国家航空航天情报中心引文2013），迄今为止共报告了15次测试，该武器系统似乎发展良好。潜在的部署地点包括古兰瓦拉、奥卡拉和伯诺-阿吉尔。

 

The medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-II (Hatf-6) appears to be operational after many years of development. Pakistan’s National Defense Complex has assembled Shaheen-II launchers since at least 2004 or 2005 (Kristensen Citation2007), and a 2020 US intelligence community report states that there are “fewer than 50” Shaheen-II launchers deployed (National Air and Space Intelligence Center Citation2020). After the most recent Shaheen-II test launch in May 2019, the Pakistani government reported the range as only 1,500 km, but the US National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) continues to set the Shaheen-II’s range at 2,000 km (ISPR Citation2019a; National Air and Space Intelligence Center Citation2020). The Shaheen-II is carried on a six-axle, road-mobile TEL and can carry a single conventional or nuclear warhead.

经过多年的发展，中程、两级、固体燃料沙欣-II（哈塔夫-6）似乎已经投入使用。巴基斯坦国防综合体至少从2004年或2005年起就组装了沙欣-II发射器（克里斯滕森 引文2007），2020年美国情报界的一份报告称，部署的沙欣-II型发射器“不到50个”（国家航空航天情报中心引文2020）。在2019年5月沙欣-II最近一次试射后，巴基斯坦政府报告称射程仅为1500 公里，但美国国家航空航天情报中心（NASIC）继续将沙欣-II的射程设定为2000 公里（ISPR 引文2019a；国家航空航天情报中心引文2020）。沙欣-II搭载在六轴公路机动TEL上，可以携带单个常规弹头或核弹头。

 

Pakistan’s newer medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-III was displayed publicly for the first time at the 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. Following a third test launch in January 2021, the Pakistani government said the missile could deliver either a single nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of 2,750 km, making it the longest-range system that Pakistan has tested (ISPR Citation2021a). Its latest test launch took place in April 2022 (Figure 2), which the Pakistani government said was “aimed at re-validating various design and technical parameters of the weapon system” (ISPR Citation2022a). The Shaheen-III is carried on an eight-axle TEL reportedly supplied by China (Panda Citation2016). The system may still require more test launches before it becomes operational.

巴基斯坦新型中程、两级固体燃料沙欣-III首次在2015年巴基斯坦日阅兵式上公开展示。继2021年1月第三次试射后，巴基斯坦政府表示，该导弹可以将单个核弹头或常规弹头发射到2750公里射程，使其成为巴基斯坦测试过的射程最远的系统（ISPR 引文2021a）。其最近一次试射发生在2022年4月（图2），巴基斯坦政府表示，此次试射“旨在重新验证武器系统的各种设计和技术参数”（ISPR引文2022a）。据报道，沙欣-III由中国提供的八轴TEL运载（Panda 引文2016）。该系统在投入使用之前可能仍需要更多的测试发射。

 

Figure 2. The Pakistani army test-launched a Shaheen-III medium-range ballistic missile in April 2022. (Archive image from 2015 via Pakistani military).

图2:巴基斯坦军队于2022年4月试射了一枚沙欣-III中程弹道导弹。（2015年巴基斯坦军方提供的档案图片）。

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The range of the Shaheen-III is sufficient to target all of mainland India from launch positions in most of Pakistan south of Islamabad. But the missile was apparently developed to do more than that. According to Gen. Kidwai, the range of 2,750 km was determined by a need to be able to target the Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean that are “developed as strategic bases” where “India might think of putting its weapons” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Citation2015, 10). But for a 2,750-km range Shaheen-III to reach the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it would need to be launched from positions in the very Eastern parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian border.

沙欣-III的射程足以从伊斯兰堡以南的巴基斯坦大部分地区的发射阵地瞄准整个印度大陆。但这种导弹的研制目的显然不止于此。根据基德瓦伊将军的说法，2750公里的射程是由能够瞄准印度洋东部的尼科巴群岛和安达曼群岛的需要决定的，这些岛屿“被开发为战略基地”，“印度可能会考虑在那里部署武器”（卡内基国际和平基金会 引文2015，10）。但要想让沙欣-III的2750公里射程到达安达曼和尼科巴群岛，它需要从巴基斯坦最东部靠近印度边境的阵地发射。

 

Pakistan’s oldest nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuel Ghauri (Hatf-5), was most recently test-launched in October 2018 (ISPR Citation2018c). The Ghauri is based on North Korea’s Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. The Pakistani government states that the Ghauri can carry a single conventional or nuclear warhead to a range of 1,300 km. However, NASIC lists its range slightly lower at 1,250 km and suggests that “fewer than 50” Ghauri launchers have been deployed (National Air and Space Intelligence Center Citation2020). The extra time needed to fuel the missile before launch makes the Ghauri more vulnerable to attack than Pakistan’s newer solid-fuel missiles. Therefore, it is possible that the longer-range versions of the Shaheen may eventually replace the Ghauri. Potential deployment areas for the Ghauri include the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot area and the Khuzdar Garrison, which expanded its perimeter in late 2017 to include three additional TEL garages.

巴基斯坦最古老的具有核能力的中程弹道导弹，公路机动单级液体燃料“高里”（哈塔夫-5），最近一次试射于2018年10月（ISPR引文2018c）。“高里”是以朝鲜的“劳动”中程弹道导弹为基础的。巴基斯坦政府表示，“高里”i可以携带一枚常规弹头或核弹头，射程为1300 公里。然而，NASIC列出的射程略低，为1250公里，并表明部署的“高里”发射器“不到50个”（国家航空航天情报中心 引文2020）。导弹发射前需要额外的时间为其提供燃料，这使得““高里”导弹比巴基斯坦新型固体燃料导弹更容易受到攻击。因此，“沙欣”的远程版本可能最终取代“高里”。“高里”的潜在部署区域包括萨果达中央弹药库区域和胡兹达尔驻军，后者在2017年末扩大了周边范围，增加了三个TEL车库。

 

On January 24, 2017, Pakistan test-launched a new medium-range ballistic missile called Ababeel that the government says is “capable of carrying multiple warheads, using multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology” (ISPR Citation2017b).Footnote5 The three-stage, solid-fuel, nuclear-capable missile, which is currently under development at the National Defense Complex, appears to be derived from the Shaheen-III airframe and solid-fuel motor and has a range of 2,200 km (ISPR Citation2017b; National Air and Space Intelligence Center Citation2020). After the test-launch, the Pakistani government declared that the test was intended to validate the missile’s “various design and technical parameters,” and that Ababeel is “aimed at ensuring survivability of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment, ... further reinforc[ing] deterrence” (ISPR Citation2017b). Development of multiple-warhead capability appears to be intended as a countermeasure against India’s planned ballistic missile defense system (Tasleem Citation2017). Its status remains unclear as of July 2023.

2017年1月24日，巴基斯坦试射了一种名为“阿巴比尔”的新型中程弹道导弹，政府称其“能够使用多弹头独立再入飞行器（MIRV）技术携带多弹头”（ISPR 引文2017b）。脚注5 这枚三级固体燃料核导弹目前正在国防综合体开发中，似乎是由沙欣-III弹身和固体燃料发动机衍生而来，射程为2200公里（ISPR引文2017b；国家航空航天情报中心引文2020）。试射后，巴基斯坦政府宣布，此次试验旨在验证导弹的“各种设计和技术参数”，阿巴比尔“旨在确保巴基斯坦弹道导弹在日益增长的地区弹道导弹防御环境中的生存能力，……进一步加强威慑”（ISPR 引文2017b）。发展多弹头能力似乎是为了对抗印度计划中的弹道导弹防御系统（Tasleem 引用 2017）。截至2023年7月，其状况仍不明朗。

 

Land-based missile garrisons

陆基导弹驻军

 

The total number and location of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable missile bases and facilities remains unknown. In particular, it is highly challenging to discern between Pakistani military bases intended to serve conventional-only strike roles and those intended to serve dual-capable or nuclear-specific strike roles.

巴基斯坦具有核能力的导弹基地和设施的总数和地点仍然未知。特别是，区分旨在仅发挥常规打击作用的巴基斯坦军事基地和旨在发挥双重能力或特定核打击作用的军事基地是一项极具挑战性的任务。

 

Analysis of commercial satellite imagery suggests that Pakistan maintains at least five missile bases that could serve a role in Pakistan’s nuclear forces. Very little has changed with these bases since our most recent overview in 2016 (Kristensen Citation2016).

对商业卫星图像的分析表明，巴基斯坦至少有五个导弹基地，可以在巴基斯坦的核力量中发挥作用。自2016年我们的最新综述（克里斯滕森 引用 2016）以来，这些基础几乎没有变化。

 

Akro Garrison (25.5483, 68.3343)

阿克罗驻军（25.5483，68.3343）

 

The Akro Garrison is located around 18 kilometers north of Hyderabad in the southern part of the Sindh Province, and around 145 kilometers away from the Indian border. The garrison covers an area of approximately 6.9 square kilometers, and it has undergone gradual expansion since 2004. The Akro Garrison consists of six missile TEL garages that appear to be designed for 12 launchers. Under the TEL garage complex, there is a unique underground facility, the construction of which can be seen through past satellite imagery. The underground facility has two cross-shaped sections connected by a central corridor that leads to two buildings on either side via covered access ramps.

阿克罗驻军位于信德省南部海得拉巴以北约18公里处，距离印度边境约145公里。驻军面积约6.9平方公里，自2004年以来逐步扩大。阿克罗驻军由六个导弹TEL车库组成，这些车库似乎是为12套发射器设计的。TEL车库建筑群下方有一个独特的地下设施，通过过去的卫星图像可以看到其施工情况。地下设施有两个十字形部分，由中央走廊连接，中央走廊通过有盖的入口坡道通向两侧的两栋建筑。

 

Analysis of a vehicle training area in the northeast corner of the garrison shows what appear to be five-axle TELs for the Babur cruise missile weapon system.

对驻军东北角的一个车辆训练区的分析显示，巴布尔巡航导弹武器系统似乎采用五轴TEL。

 

Gujranwala Garrison (32.2410, 74.0730)

古兰瓦拉 加里森（32.2410,74.0730）

 

The Gujranwala Garrison is one of the largest military complexes in Pakistan (Figure 3). It covers nearly 30 square kilometers in the northeastern part of the Punjab Province and is located about 60 kilometers from the Indian border. Since 2010, the Gujranwala Garrison has added what appears to be a TEL launcher area immediately east of a likely storage site for conventional munitions, which became operational in 2014 or 2015. The TEL area consists of two identical sections, each of which contain several launcher garages as well as a possible weapons loading hall with reinforced embankments connected via covered passageway to what appears to be a reinforced weapons storage bunker. There is also a technical area slightly south of the main TEL area for servicing the launchers. The security perimeter seems to be designed for potentially adding a third TEL section.

古兰瓦拉 加里森驻军是巴基斯坦最大的军事综合体之一（图3）。它位于旁遮普省东北部，占地近30平方公里，距离印度边境约60公里。自2010年以来，古兰瓦拉驻军在一个可能的常规弹药储存点的东部增加了一个似乎是TEL发射器的区域，该区域于2014年或2015年投入使用。TEL区域由两个相同的部分组成，每个部分都包含几个发射器车库以及一个可能的武器装载大厅，该大厅通过有盖通道连接到似乎是加固武器储存掩体的加固堤坝。在TEL主区以南略有一个技术区，用于维修发射器。安全周界的设计似乎是为了可能增加第三个TEL部分。

 

Figure 3. Similar design of TEL areas at Gujranwala and Pano Aqil Garrisons. (Image: Maxar Technologies/Federation of American Scientists).

图3。在古兰瓦拉和帕诺阿奎尔花园的TEL地区的类似设计。（图片： Maxar技术公司/美国科学家联合会）。

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Several trucks that strongly resemble the Nasr short-range missile system can be seen on satellite imagery. Although it is impossible to be certain, these trucks appear to have a twin box launcher similar to that of which can be seen on Nasr test launch photos. The Nasr’s estimated range is the equivalent of the garrison’s distance from the Indian border.

卫星图像上可以看到几辆与“纳斯尔”（Nasr）短程导弹系统非常相似的卡车。虽然无法确定，但这些卡车似乎有一个双联箱形发射器，类似于“纳斯尔”试射照片上的发射器。“纳斯尔”估计的射程相当于驻军与印度边境的距离。

 

Khuzdar Garrison (27.7222, 66.6241)

胡兹达尔驻军（27.7222，66.6241）

 

The Khuzdar Garrison is located approximately 220 kilometers west of Sukkur in south-east Balochistan Province, and the furthest known missile garrison from the Indian border. The base is split into two sections: a northern section and a southern section (where the TELs are based). The southern section of the base expanded its perimeter in late-2017 to include three additional TEL garages, bringing the total to six. Also included in this section are two multi-story weapon handling buildings with covered ramps leading to a possible underground nuclear storage area similar to the one visible at the Akro Garrison. Likely nuclear-capable missile launchers, possibly Ghauri or Shaheen-II TELs, have been spotted with commercial satellite imagery at Khuzdar. An eastern section of the base that appeared to be another TEL garage area was under construction over a decade ago; however, that expansion seems to have been canceled.

胡兹达尔驻军位于俾路支省东南部的苏库尔以西约220公里处，也是目前已知的最远离印度边境的导弹驻军。基地分为两个部分：北部部分和南部部分（TEL的基地）。该基地的南部部分在2017年底扩大了其周边范围，增加了三个TEL车库，使总数达到6个。还包括在这部分是两个多层武器处理建筑，有覆盖的坡道，通向一个可能的地下核储存区，类似于在阿克罗驻军可见的一个。可能有核能力的导弹发射器，可能是“高里”或“沙欣--II”导弹发射器，已经在胡兹达尔被商业卫星图像发现。基地的东部部分似乎是另一个TEL车库区，十多年前正在建设中；然而，扩张似乎被取消了。

 

Pano Aqil Garrison (27.8328, 69.1575)

帕诺阿基尔驻军（27.8328，69.1575）

 

The Pano Aqil Garrison is located only 85 kilometers from the Indian border, in the northern part of Sindh Province, and is split up in several sections that cover a combined area of nearly 20 square kilometers. The double-fenced TEL area is located 1.8 kilometers northeast of the main garrison and includes eight garages (the last three were completed in 2017), each of which has spaces for six TELs. An additional ninth garage near the others appears to have openings for five vehicles. Altogether, this garrison could potentially support approximately 50 TELs; however, some of these garage spaces are likely to hold support vehicles as well. Large numbers of TELs, including for Babur and Shaheen-I missiles, are regularly visible at this garrison through commercial satellite imagery (Figure 3).

帕诺阿基尔驻军位于信德省北部，距离印度边境仅85公里，被分成几个部分，总面积近20平方公里。双围栏TEL区域位于主要驻军东北1.8公里处，包括8个车库（最后三个车库于2017年完工），每个车库都有6辆TEL的空间。其他车库附近的第九个车库似乎有五辆车的开口。总共，这个驻军可能支持大约50辆TEL；然而，其中一些车库可能也可以容纳支援车辆。大量的TEL，包括“巴布尔”和“沙欣-I”型导弹，可以通过商业卫星图像经常在这个驻军中看到（图3）。

 

Slightly north of the TEL garages within the same double-fenced perimeter is a below-grade facility that appears to be a weapons storage igloo. The igloo is connected via a covered ramp to a multi-story TEL loading hall. The TEL and likely weapons storage areas are nearly identical in design to those visible at Gujranwala.

在TEL车库稍北的同一双围栏周边内是一个地下设施，看起来是一个武器储存拱形圆顶建筑。拱形圆顶建筑通过一个有顶棚的坡道连接到一个多层的TEL装载大厅。TEL和可能的武器储存区域在设计上几乎与在古兰瓦拉看到的相同。

 

Sargodha Garrison (31.9722, 72.6838)

萨戈达·加里森（31.9722,72.6838）

 

The Sargodha Garrison is a large complex located within and around the Kirana Hills, a subcritical nuclear test site used by Pakistan to develop its nuclear program from 1983 to 1990. Directly northwest of a likely conventional munitions storage area, there appear to be 10 dispersed potential TEL garages plus an additional two garages with different dimensions that could be used for maintenance. The TEL area does not have the same layout or perimeter as other TEL areas across the country, although this could be a function of the garrison’s age.

萨戈达驻军是位于基拉纳山内及其周边的一个大型综合体，基拉纳山是巴基斯坦在1983年至1990年期间用来开发其核项目的一个亚临界核试验基地。在一个可能是常规弹药储存区的正西北方向，似乎有10个分散的潜在TEL车库和另外两个不同尺寸的车库，可以用于维护。TEL区块与全国其他TEL区块没有相同的布局或周边区块，尽管这可能是驻军年代的一个变量。

 

Directly east of the conventional munitions storage area is an underground storage area built into the side of the mountain range. At least 10 underground facility entrances are visible through commercial satellite imagery, as well as potential facilities for weapon and missile handling.

常规弹药储存区的正东方是一个建在山脉一侧的地下储存区。通过商业卫星图像可以看到至少10个地下设施入口，以及潜在的武器和导弹处理设施。

 

Ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles

地射和海射巡航导弹

 

Pakistan’s family of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles is undergoing significant development with work on several types and modifications. The Babur (Hatf-7) is a subsonic, dual-capable cruise missile with a similar appearance to the US Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, the Chinese DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile, and the Russian air-launched AS-15. The Pakistani government describes the Babur as having “stealth capabilities” and “pinpoint accuracy” and “a low-altitude, terrain-hugging missile with high maneuverability” (ISPR Citation2011b, Citation2016b, Citation2018a, 2018b). The Babur is much slimmer than Pakistan’s ballistic missiles, suggesting some success with warhead miniaturization based on a boosted fission design.

巴基斯坦的地射和海射巡航导弹系列正在进行重大发展，并进行了几种类型和改进。“巴布尔”（Hatf-7）是一种亚音速、双能力巡航导弹，外观与美国战斧海射巡航导弹、中国DH-10地射巡航导弹和俄罗斯空射AS-15相似。巴基斯坦政府将“巴布尔”描述为具有“隐形能力”和“精确定位”，是“一种具有高机动性的低空、贴地式导弹”（ISPR引文2011b、引文2016b、引文2018a、2018b）。“巴布尔”导弹比巴基斯坦的弹道导弹要细得多，这表明基于增强裂变设计的弹头小型化取得了一些成功。

 

The original Babur-1 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) has been test-launched nearly a dozen times and is likely to be operational with the armed forces. Its road-mobile launcher appears to be a unique five-axle TEL with a three-tube box launcher that is different than the quadruple box launcher used for static display. At different times, the Pakistani government has reported the range to be 600 km and 700 km (ISPR Citation2011b, Citation2012a, Citation2012b, Citation2012c), but the US intelligence community sets the range much lower, at 350 km (National Air and Space Intelligence Center Citation2020).

最初的“巴布尔”-1型地面发射巡航导弹（GLCM）已经试射了近十几次，很可能与武装部队一起作战。其公路机动发射装置似乎是一种独特的五轴TEL车辆，带有三联箱体式发射器，不同于用于静态显示的四联箱体式发射器。在不同的时间，巴基斯坦政府报告的射程分别为600公里和700公里（ISPR引文2011b、引文2012a、引文2012b、引文2012-201c），但美国情报界将射程设定得低得多，为350公里（国家航空航天情报中心引文2020）。

 

Pakistan appears to be upgrading the original Babur-1 missiles into Babur-1A missiles by upgrading their avionics and navigation systems to enable target engagement both on land and at sea. Following the system’s most recent test in February 2021, the Pakistani military stated that the Babur-1A’s range was 450 km (ISPR Citation2021e).

巴基斯坦似乎正在通过升级其航空电子和导航系统，将最初的巴布尔-1导弹升级为巴布尔-1A导弹，以实现陆地和海上的目标交战。在该系统于2021年2月进行最新测试后，巴基斯坦军方表示，巴布尔-1A的射程为450公里（ISPR引文2021e）。

 

Pakistan is also developing an enhanced version of the Babur known as the Babur-2 or Babur-1B GLCM.Footnote6 The weapon has been test-launched in December 2016, April 2018, and December 2021 (ISPR Citation2016b, Citation2018a, Citation2018b, Citation2021d, Citation2021g). Indian news media reported that the Babur-2/Babur-1B had failed two other prior tests, in April 2018 and March 2020; however, this was not confirmed by Pakistan (Gupta Citation2020). With a physical appearance and capabilities like those of the Babur, the Babur-2/Babur-1B apparently has an extended range of 700 km, and “is capable of carrying various types of warheads” (ISPR Citation2016b, Citation2018a, Citation2018b). The fact that both the Babur-1 and the “enhanced” Babur-2/Babur-1B have been noted as possessing a range of 700 km indicates that the range of the initial Babur-1 system was likely shorter. NASIC has not released information on an enhanced system. After the first test in 2016, the Pakistani government noted that the system is “an important force multiplier for Pakistan’s strategic defense” (ISPR Citation2016b).

巴基斯坦也在开发一种被称为巴布尔-2或巴布尔-1B GLCM的增强型巴布尔。脚注6该武器已于2016年12月、2018年4月和2021年12月试射（ISPR引文2016b、引文2018a、引文2018b、引文2021d、引文2021g）。印度新闻媒体报道称，巴布尔-2/巴布尔-1B在2018年4月和2020年3月的另外两次测试中均未通过；然而，巴基斯坦并未证实这一点（Gupta引文2020）。巴布尔-2/巴布尔-1B具有与巴布尔类似的物理外观和能力，显然具有700公里的增程，“能够携带各种类型的弹头”（ISPR引文2016b，引文2018a，引文2018b）。巴布尔-1和“增强型”巴布尔-2/巴布尔-1B的射程均为700公里，这表明最初的巴布尔-1系统的射程可能更短。NASIC尚未发布有关增强系统的信息。在2016年的第一次测试后，巴基斯坦政府指出，该系统是“巴基斯坦战略防御的重要力量倍增器”（ISPR引文2016b）。

 

Babur TELs have been fitting out at the National Development Complex for several years and have recently been seen at the Akro garrison northeast of Karachi. The garrison includes a large enclosure with six garages that have room for 12 TELs and a unique underground facility that is probably used to store the missiles.

巴布尔 TEL已经在国家发展中心装备了好几年，最近在卡拉奇东北部的阿克罗驻军也有人看到。驻军包括一个带六个车库的大围栏，可容纳12辆TEL，以及一个可能用于储存导弹的独特地下设施。

 

Pakistan is also developing a sea-launched version of the Babur known as Babur-3. The weapon is still in development and has been test-launched twice: On January 9, 2017, from “an underwater, mobile platform” in the Indian Ocean (ISPR Citation2017a); and on March 29, 2018 from “an underwater dynamic platform” (ISPR Citation2018a). The Babur-3 is said to be a sea-based variant of the Babur-2 GLCM, and to have a range of 450 km (ISPR Citation2017a).

巴基斯坦也在开发名为“巴布尔-3”的“巴布尔”海上发射版本。该武器仍在开发中，已两次试射：2017年1月9日，从印度洋的“水下移动平台”发射（ISPR引文2017a）；2018年3月29日，来自“水下动态平台”（ISPR引文2018a）。巴布尔-3据说是巴布尔-2 GLCM的海基改型，射程为450公里（ISPR引文2017a）。

 

The Pakistani government says the Babur-3 is “capable of delivering various types of payloads … [that] … will provide Pakistan with a Credible Second Strike Capability, augmenting deterrence,” and described it as “a step toward reinforcing [the] policy of credible minimum deterrence” (ISPR Citation2017a). The Babur-3 will most likely be deployed on the Pakistan Navy’s three Agosta-90B diesel—electric submarines (Khan Citation2015; Panda and Narang Citation2017). In April 2015, the Pakistani government approved the purchase of eight right air-independent propulsion-powered (AIP) submarines from China (Khan, B. Citation2019). The deal stipulated for four of the submarines to be constructed at the Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Group (WSIG) in China, and for the remaining four to be built at Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works in Pakistan (Sutton Citation2020). On December 21, 2022, Pakistan laid the keel for the first submarine, the Tasnim, and commenced the steel cutting of the second submarine at the Karachi Shipyard (Navy Citation2022). The first submarine under construction in China is expected to be delivered by the end of 2023 and the remaining four assembled in Karachi are expected to be completed by 2028 (Sutton Citation2020). It is possible that these new submarines, which will be called the Hangor-class, could eventually be assigned a nuclear role with the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile.

巴基斯坦政府表示，巴布尔-3“能够运载各种类型的有效载荷……[这]……将为巴基斯坦提供可信的第二次打击能力，增强威慑力”，并将其描述为“朝着加强可信的最低威慑政策迈出的一步”（ISPR引文2017a）。巴布尔-3最有可能部署在巴基斯坦海军的三艘阿戈斯塔-90B柴电潜艇上（Khan引文2015；Panda和Narang引文2017）。2015年4月，巴基斯坦政府批准从中国购买八艘配备了不依赖空气推进系统（AIP）潜艇（Khan，B.引文2019）。该协议规定，其中四艘潜艇将在中国武昌造船工业集团（WSIG）建造，其余四艘将在巴基斯坦卡拉奇造船厂和工程厂建造（Sutton 引文 2020）。2022年12月21日，巴基斯坦为第一艘潜艇“塔斯尼姆”号铺设龙骨，并在卡拉奇造船厂开始对第二艘潜艇进行钢切割（海军引文2022）。第一艘在中国建造的潜艇预计将于2023年底交付，其余四艘在卡拉奇组装的潜艇预计于2028年完工（Sutton 引文2020）。这些被称为汉格尔级的新型潜艇有可能最终与巴布尔-3潜射巡航导弹一起发挥核作用。

 

Once it becomes operational, the Babur-3 will provide Pakistan with a triad of nuclear strike platforms from ground, air, and sea. The Pakistani government said the Babur-3 was motivated by a need to match India’s nuclear triad and the “nuclearization of [the] Indian Ocean Region” (ISPR Citation2018a). The Pakistani government also noted that Babur-3’s stealth technologies would be useful in the “emerging regional Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) environment” (ISPR Citation2017a).

一旦投入使用，巴布尔-3将为巴基斯坦提供从地面、空中和海上的三重核打击平台。巴基斯坦政府表示，巴布尔-3的目的是需要匹配印度的核三位一体和“印度洋地区的核化”（ISPR引文2018a）。巴基斯坦政府还指出，巴布尔-3的隐形技术将在“新兴的区域弹道导弹防御（BMD）环境”中有用（ISPR引文2017a）。

 

The future submarine-based nuclear capability is managed by Headquarters Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC), which the government said in 2012 would be the “custodian of the nation’s 2nd strike capability” to “strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional stability” (ISPR Citation2012a). Kidwai in 2015 publicly acknowledged the need for a sea-based second-strike capability and said it “will come into play in the next few years” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Citation2015, 16). Kidwai may have been referring to the new Hangor-class submarines.

未来的潜艇核能力由海军战略部队司令部总部管理，政府在2012年表示，该司令部将是“国家第二次打击能力的托管者”，以“加强巴基斯坦的可信最小威慑政策，确保地区稳定”（ISPR引文2012a）。基德瓦伊在2015年公开承认需要海基第二次打击能力，并表示“将在未来几年内发挥作用”（卡内基国际和平基金会引文2015，16）。基德瓦伊可能指的是新型汉格尔级潜艇。

 

Pakistan is also developing a variant of the Babur cruise missile, known as the Harbah, that can be carried by surface vessels. In March 2022, Pakistan featured the new missile during the 11th Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX). The Pakistan Navy spokesperson described the Harbah as an “all-weather” subsonic cruise missile with anti-ship and land-attack capabilities and a range of approximately 290 km (Vavasseur Citation2022). According to the spokesperson, the Harbah has been inducted into the Pakistan Navy and deployed on Azmat-class surface ships (Vavasseur Citation2022). It remains unclear whether the Harbah will be dual-capable.

巴基斯坦还在开发一种被称为“哈巴”的巴布尔巡航导弹改型，该导弹可以由水面舰艇携带。2022年3月，巴基斯坦在第11届多哈国际海上防御展览会（DIMDEX）上展示了新型导弹。巴基斯坦海军发言人将“哈巴”描述为一种“全天候”亚音速巡航导弹，具有反舰和对地攻击能力，射程约290公里（瓦瓦瑟尔 引文2022）。根据发言人的说法，“哈巴”已被编入巴基斯坦海军，并部署在阿兹马特级水面舰艇上（瓦瓦瑟尔 引文2022）。目前尚不清楚哈巴是否具有双重能力。

 

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

披露声明

提交人没有报告潜在的利益冲突。

 

Funding

Research for this publication was carried out with generous contributions from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, the Prospect Hill Foundation, Longview Philanthropy, the Stewart R. Mott Foundation, the Future of Life Institute, Open Philanthropy, and individual donors.

基金

本出版物的研究得到了约翰·D·和凯瑟琳·T·麦克阿瑟基金会、新土地基金会、犁头基金会、展望山基金会、朗维尤慈善机构、斯图尔特·R·莫特基金会、生命未来研究所、开放慈善机构和个人捐助者的慷慨捐助。

 

Additional information

贡献者说明

 

Hans M. Kristensen

汉斯·M·克里斯滕森

 

Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. His work focuses on researching and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the policies that direct them. Kristensen is a coauthor of the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations. He has coauthored the Nuclear Notebook since 2001. Inquiries should be directed to FAS, 1112 16th Street NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC, 20036 USA.

汉斯·M·克里斯滕森是华盛顿特区美国科学家联合会核信息项目主任。他的工作重点是研究和写作核武器的现状以及指导核武器的政策。克里斯滕森是SIPRI年鉴（牛津大学出版社）《世界核力量概览》的合著者，也是新闻媒体核武器政策和行动的经常顾问。自2001年起，他与人合著了《核能笔记本》。如需查询，请联系FAS，地址：1112 16th Street NW，Suite 600，Washington，DC，20036 USA。

 

Matt Korda

马特·科尔达

 

Matt Korda is a senior research fellow for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and an Associate Researcher with the Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Previously, he worked for the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO headquarters in Brussels. He received his MA in International Peace and Security from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Matt’s research and open-source discoveries about nuclear weapons have made headlines across the globe, and his work is regularly used by governments, policymakers, academics, journalists, and the broader public in order to challenge assumptions and improve accountability about nuclear arsenals and trends.

马特·科尔达是美国科学家联合会核信息项目的高级研究员，也是斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所核裁军、军备控制和不扩散方案的副研究员。此前，他曾在布鲁塞尔北约总部的军备控制、裁军和大规模杀伤性武器不扩散中心工作。他在伦敦国王学院战争研究系获得了国际和平与安全硕士学位。马特关于核武器的研究和开源发现成为全球头条新闻，他的工作经常被政府、政策制定者、学者、记者和广大公众使用，以挑战假设，提高对核武库和趋势的问责性。

 

Eliana Johns

艾丽安娜·约翰斯

 

Eliana Johns is a research associate for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, where she researches the status and trends of global nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons. Previously, Eliana worked as a project associate for DPRK Counterproliferation at CRDF Global, focusing on WMD nonproliferation initiatives to curb North Korea’s ability to gain revenue to build its weapons programs. Eliana graduated with her bachelor’s in political science with minors in Music and Korean from the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC).

艾丽安娜·约翰斯是美国科学家联合会核信息项目的研究员，她在该项目中研究全球核力量的现状和趋势以及核武器的作用。此前，艾丽安娜曾在CRDF Global担任朝鲜反扩散项目助理，专注于大规模杀伤性武器的防扩散举措，以遏制朝鲜获得建设武器项目收入的能力。艾丽安娜毕业于马里兰大学巴尔的摩县分校（UMBC），获得政治学学士学位，辅修音乐和韩语。

 

Notes

注释

 

1. These assumptions of estimated fissile material quantities for different weapon designs are adapted from Table A.1 of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (Citation2015), Global Fissile Materials Report 2015: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production report, http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr15.pdf.

 

2. These estimates are based on reprocessing and uranium enrichment plant capacities in International Panel on Fissile Materials (Citation2022), Global Fissile Materials Report 2022: Fifty Years of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, https://fissilematerials.org/publications/2022/07/global_fissile_material_r.html, as well as more recent estimates by the International Panel on Fissile Materials.

 

3. For detailed analysis of possible Pakistani air bases, nuclear facilities, and missile brigade locations, see Kristensen (Citation2016).

 

4. For an excellent analysis of this doctrine and Pakistan’s potential use of battlefield nuclear weapons, see Nayyar and Mian (Citation2010).

 

5. Note that the correct expansion of MIRV is multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle.

 

6. It is possible that the Babur-2 and the Babur-1B are the same missile. Both names are referenced as “enhanced” versions of the Babur.