Posted on Oct.22, 2020 in Arms Control, Nuclear Weapons, Russia, United States by Hans M. Kristensen

发表于2020年10月22日，军备控制，核武器，俄罗斯，美国，汉斯·克里斯滕森（Hans M. Kristensen）

 

By Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda

October 22, 2020

2020年10月22日作者：汉斯·克里斯滕森和马特·科达

 

In their effort to paint the New START treaty as insufficient and a bad deal for the United States and its allies, Trump administration official have recently made statements suggesting the treaty limits the US nuclear arsenal more than it limits the Russian arsenal.

特朗普政府官员最近发表声明，认为新的《削减战略武器条约》不充分，对美国及其盟国是一个糟糕的协议，他们认为该条约限制美国核武库的程度大于限制俄罗斯的核武库。

 

New START imposes the same restrictions on US and Russian strategic nuclear forces.

《新战略武器条约》对美国和俄罗斯的战略核力量施加了同样的限制。

 

During a virtual conference organized by the Heritage Foundation on October 13, Marshall Billingslea, special presidential envoy for arms control, stated: “What we’ve indicated to the Russians is that we are in fact willing to extend the New START Treaty for some period of time provided that they agree to a limitation, a freeze, in their nuclear arsenal. We’re willing to do the same. I don’t see how it’s in anyone’s interests to allow Russia to build up its inventory of these tactical nuclear weapons systems with which they like to threaten NATO…We cannot agree to a construct that leaves unaddressed 55 percent or more of the Russian arsenal.”

在美国传统基金会于10月13日组织的虚拟会议上，负责军备控制的总统特使马歇尔·比林斯利（Marshall Billingslea）表示：“我们向俄罗斯人表明，我们实际上愿意延长新的《削减战略武器条约》一段时间，前提是他们同意限制、冻结其核武库。 我们愿意这样做。 我不认为允许俄罗斯建立它们想威胁北约的战术核武器系统的清单对任何人都是有利的……我们不能同意这样一种构架，该构架会留下未解决的55％或更多的俄罗斯军火库。 ”

 

One week later, in an interview on National Public Radio, Billingslea added: “The New START treaty constraints…92 percent of the entire U.S. arsenal, of our deterrent” but “only covers 45 percent or less of the Russian arsenal…”

一周后，比林斯利（Billingslea）在国家公共广播电台的一次采访中补充说：“新的《削减战略武器条约》限制了我们整个威慑力量……占整个美国军火库的92％”，但“仅覆盖了俄罗斯军火库的45％或更少……”

 

Finally, on October 21, Secretary of State Michal Pompeo repeated this talking point: “President Trump has made clear that the New START Treaty by itself is not a good deal for the United States or our friends or allies. Only 45 percent of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is subject to numerical limits, posing a threat to the United States and our NATO allies. Meanwhile, that agreement restricts 92 percent of America’s arsenal that is subject to the limits contained in the New START agreement.”

最后，在10月21日，国务卿米歇尔·蓬佩奥（Michal Pompeo）重申了这一观点：“特朗普总统明确表示，新的《削减战略武器条约》本身对美国或我们的朋友或盟国而言不是一个好交易。 俄罗斯只有45％的核武库受到数字限制，对美国和我们的北约盟国构成威胁。 同时，该协议限制了美国92％的军火库，但要遵守新《削减战略武器条约》中的限制。”

 

Pompeo and Billingslea didn’t specify what they meant by “arsenal” and the reaction from nuclear weapons analysts – ourselves included – was bewilderment. Most assumed “arsenal” was referring warheads, but the numbers don’t seem to fit with the percentages and descriptions in the statements. Interestingly, the percentages and categories seem to work better for launchers, unless one does a back-of-the-envelope calculation.

蓬佩奥和比林斯利没有说明他们所说的“军火库”是什么意思，核武器分析人士（包括我们自己）的反应令人困惑。大多数人认为“军火库”指的是核弹头，但数字似乎与声明中的百分比和描述不符。有趣的是，百分比和类别似乎对发射器更有效，除非有人做了一个背面的计算。

 

Matching Comparison With Warheads

与弹头匹配比较

 

Our first step was to analyze the statements and see if we could make them fit with our understanding of the size and composition of the nuclear arsenals. If we assume the percentages and descriptions refer to warhead numbers, then we see the following potential options:

我们的第一步是分析这些陈述，看看我们是否可以使它们符合我们对核武库规模和组成的理解。 如果我们假设百分比和描述是针对弹头数量的，那么我们将看到以下潜在选项：

 

Option 1: The 45% refers to New START warhead limit for deployed strategic warheads (1,550). If this were the case, then Russia’s entire stockpile would only consist of 3,445 warheads, which we doubt. Our estimate is 4,310. For the United States, 1,550 would only constitute 41% of the US stockpile, not 92% as stated by Billingslea.

选项1：45％是指已部署的战略弹头的新《削减战略武器条约》弹头限制（1,550）。 如果真是这样，那么俄罗斯的整个库存将只有3,445枚弹头，我们对此表示怀疑。 我们的估计是4,310枚。 对于美国来说，1,550枚只占美国库存的41％，而不是比林斯利亚所说的92％。

 

Option 2: The 45% refers to the number of strategic warheads that can be loaded onto ICBMs and SLBMs but not bomber weapons. New START counts actual numbers of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, but not those on bomber bases. According to our estimate of Russian forces, their ICBMs can load 1,136 warheads and SLBMs can load 720 warheads, a total of 1,856 warheads. That would constitute 43% of the total stockpile of 4,310 warheads (our estimate). It would of course be embarrassing if the US officials have been using our numbers instead of those of the US Intelligence Community. Even so, that methodology does not fit with the 92% comparison used for the United States. US ICBMs and SLBMs can load a maximum of 2,720 warheads, by our estimate, or 72% of the stockpile. And Billingslea explicitly says the US comparison includes the “entire” arsenal.

选项2：45％是指可装载到洲际弹道导弹（ICBM）和潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）而不是轰炸机武器上的战略弹头数量。新《削减战略武器条约》计入部署的洲际弹道导弹和潜射弹道导弹的弹头的实际数量，但不包括轰炸机基地的弹头实际数量。根据我们对俄罗斯军队的估计，他们的洲际弹道导弹可以装载1136枚核弹头，而潜射弹道导弹可以装载720枚弹头，总共1856枚核弹头。这将占4,310枚弹头（我们的估计）总库存的43％。 如果美国官员一直使用我们的数字而不是美国情报部门的数字，那当然会令人尴尬。即使这样，该方法也不适合美国使用的92％的比较。根据我们的估计，美国洲际弹道导弹和潜射弹道导弹最多可以装载2,720枚弹头，占库存的72％。比林斯利明确表示，美国的比较包括“整个”武器库。

 

Option 3: The 45% refers to the total number of strategic warheads in the Russian arsenal (deployed and non-deployed). If that were the case, then the remaining 55% of 3,025 warheads would be non-strategic warheads, far more than the “up to 2,000” stated in the Nuclear Posture Review. And it would imply a total stockpile of 5,500 warheads, far more than the number of warhead spaces on launchers.

选项3：45％是指俄罗斯军火库（已部署和未部署）中战略弹头的总数。 如果真是这样，那么3,025枚核弹头中的剩余55％将是非战略性弹头，远远超过《核态势评估》中所说的“最多2,000枚”。 这将意味着总储备弹头为5500个，远远超过发射器上弹头空间的数量。

 

Option 4: The percentage numbers come from a simplistic back-of-the-envelope calculation. The Russian 45% is 1,550 (New START limit) / 1,550 (reserve) + 2,000 (tactical). The US 92% is 1,550 (New START limit) / 1,550 (reserve) + 150 (tactical). Those numbers don’t fully match the stockpiles and statements but can explain the comparison. (We are indebted to Pavel Podvig for suggesting this option.)

选项4：百分比数字来自简化的封底计算。俄语的45％为1,550（新《削减战略武器条约》限制/1,550（储备）+ 2,000（战术）。美国的92％是1,550（新《削减战略武器条约》限制）/1,550（储备）+ 150（战术）。这些数字与库存和声明不完全匹配，但可以解释比较。（我们感谢Pavel Podvig建议使用此选项。）

 

Billingslea and Pompeo both compared the Russian restrictions to those affecting the US arsenal, but they described it differently.

比林斯利和蓬佩奥都将俄罗斯的限制与影响美国军火库的限制进行了比较，但他们的描述有所不同。

 

Billingslea said New START “constraints…92 percent of the entire U.S. arsenal, of our deterrent…” (emphasis added). Since we know the approximate size of the total US stockpile (about 3,800 warheads), 92% would constitute 3,496 warheads, far more than the treaty’s limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. But the count would be close to the number of strategic warheads that can be loaded onto strategic launchers (3,570 by our estimate), leaving about 300 non-strategic warheads.

比林斯利说，新《削减战略武器条约》“限制了……整个美国军火库的92％，威慑力……”（重点强调）。由于我们知道美国总库存的大致规模（约3,800枚弹头），因此92％将构成3,496枚弹头，远远超过条约规定的1,550枚部署的战略弹头的上限。但是这个数字接近可以装载到战略发射器上的战略弹头的数量（我们估计为3570枚），剩下约300枚非战略弹头。

 

Pompeo said that New START “restricts 92 percent of America’s arsenal that is subject to the limits” (emphasis added), which is different than what Billingslea said because it doesn’t appear to include non-deployed strategic warheads or tactical warheads, two categories that are not subject to the treaty limits.

蓬佩奥说，新《削减战略武器条约》“限制了美国92％受到限制的武器库”（强调），这与比林斯利所说的不同，因为它似乎不包括未部署的战略弹头或战术弹头，这两个类别不受条约限制。

 

Matching Comparison With Launchers

与发射器的匹配比较

 

Our next step was to analyze the statements to see how they compare with the number of launchers that can deliver nuclear warheads. New START limits both sides to no more than 800 strategic launchers in total, of which no more than 700 can be deployed at any given time.

我们的下一步是分析这些陈述，以了解它们与可以运载核弹头的发射器数量的比较。新《削减战略武器条约》限制了双方总共不超过800个战略发射器，在任何给定时间最多只能部署700个。

 

In the latest set of aggregate numbers released by the US State Department, the United States is listed with exactly 800 launchers in total, of which 675 are deployed. Russia is listed with a total of 764 launchers, of which 510 are deployed.

在美国国务院发布的最新一组汇总数字中，美国一共列出了800个发射器，其中有675个已部署。 俄罗斯列有764个发射器，其中已部署510个。

 

While complaining about limits on US and Russian weapons, neither Billingslea nor Pompeo mentions this US strategic advantage of 165 deployed launchers, a number that exceeds the number of Minuteman IIIs in one missile wing and corresponds to more than half of the entire Russian ICBM force.

在抱怨美俄武器限制的同时，比林斯利和蓬佩奥都没有提到美国部署了165个发射器的战略优势，这个数字超过了一个导弹联队的民兵II型导弹数量，相当于整个俄罗斯洲际弹道导弹总兵力的一半以上。

 

For the United States, if the 800 total strategic launchers constitute 92% of all US nuclear launchers (“entire” arsenal), then that would imply the existence of another 70 launchers, which potentially could refer to non-strategic fighter-bombers assigned missions with gravity bombs.

对于美国来说，如果总共800个战略发射器构成美国所有核发射器（“整个”军火库）的92％，则意味着存在另外70个发射器，这可能是指分配给任务的非战略战斗轰炸机使用的重力炸弹。

 

For Russia, if the 764 total strategic launchers constitute 45% of all its nuclear launchers, that would potentially imply that Russia has 1,698 total nuclear launchers, of which 934 would be launchers of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

对于俄罗斯而言，如果总共764个战略发射器占其所有核发射器的45％，则可能意味着俄罗斯拥有1698个核发射器，其中934个将是非战略核武器的发射器。

 

We don’t yet know if this is the case. But the percentages mentioned by Billingslea and Pompeo appear to fit better if they refer to launchers than warheads, unless one applies the Option 4 calculation described above. The Trump administration has been particularly critical about Russia’s development of new types of strategic-range weapons that are not covered by the New START treaty, just like it has criticized that Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons are not covered by any arms control agreement.

我们尚不知道是否是这种情况。但是比林斯利和蓬佩奥提到的百分比，如果提及发射器而不是弹头，则似乎更符合，除非人们采用了上述选项4的计算方法。特朗普政府对俄罗斯延续新《削减战略武器条约》所未涵盖的新型战略射程武器的问题尤为批评，就像它批评俄罗斯的非战略核武器不受任何军备控制协议涵盖一样。

 

Context and Recommendations

背景和建议

 

The comparisons and descriptions of Russian and US nuclear forces presented by Billingslea and Pompeo are confusing. Some might suspect “fuzzy math” but until we see otherwise, we suspect the comparisons use real data. Option 4 above might represent the most likely explanation although it doesn’t fully match the stockpiles and descriptions provided by the officials.

比林斯利和蓬佩奥对俄罗斯和美国核力量的比较和描述令人困惑。有些人可能会怀疑“模糊数学”，但直到我们看到其他情况，我们才怀疑比较使用的是真实数据。上面的选项4可能是最有可能的解释，尽管它与官员提供的库存和描述不完全匹配。

 

When it comes to nuclear negotiations, it is incredibly important to be precise with official words and statements, in order to avoid misunderstandings or mischaracterizations. Unfortunately, the Trump administration has a habit of cherry-picking or spinning statistics in an apparent attempt to make existing and equitable arms control agreements seem like “bad deals” for the United States. Given this track record, we should view their statements here with skepticism and ask for clarification if they’re referring to warheads or launchers. We have done so but have not yet heard back from the State Department.

在进行核谈判时，用官方的言语和表述准确是极为重要的，以避免产生误解或误会。不幸的是，特朗普政府习惯于挑拣或捏造统计数据，这显然是在试图使现有和公平的军备控制协议对美国来说似乎是“不好的交易”。鉴于这一记录，我们应该以怀疑的态度看待他们的声明，并要求澄清他们是指弹头还是发射器。我们已经这样做了，但是还没有收到国务院的回音。

 

A one-year extension of New START is better than no extension, but it’s worse than a five-year extension because it creates uncertainty about the commitment to continue to limit force levels and unnecessarily shortens the time available to negotiate follow-on arrangements. There is no technical need to shorten the extension. If a new deal is made, the old one will fall away.

新《削减战略武器条约》延长一年比没有延长要好，但是比延长五年更糟糕，因为它使继续限制兵力水平的承诺产生不确定性，并不必要地缩短了谈判后续安排的时间。在技术上没有必要缩短延长时间。如果达成一项新的协议，旧协议就会失效。

 

A freeze on warheads would be a welcoming new step and Russia’s acceptance of the idea is a breakthrough because it opens up possibilities for building on this idea in the future. But a freeze will not have much credibility or effect without verification and despite saying it would like “portal monitoring” the Trump administration has not presented a plan for how this would work or secured Moscow’s agreement. Verification of a total warhead freeze would be much more complex than verifying the New START treaty itself and one year may not be sufficient to do the work. Has the US military and intelligence community signed off on Russian inspectors monitoring every US warhead moving in and out of facilities? Have US allies in Europe agreed to allow Russian officials to monitor the bases where the US Air Force stores nuclear bombs?

冻结弹头将是一个令人欢迎的新步骤，俄罗斯对这一想法的接受是一个突破，因为这为今后在这一想法的基础上再接再厉开辟了可能性。但是，冻结措施如果没有核实，将不会有太大的可信度或效果，尽管表示希望进行“门户监测”，但特朗普政府尚未就如何运作或确保莫斯科达成协议提出计划。核查弹头是否完全冻结将比核查新《削减战略武器条约》本身复杂得多，而且一年可能不足以完成这项工作。美国军方和情报机构是否同意俄罗斯核查人员监控每一枚进出核设施的美国核弹头？美国在欧洲的盟友是否同意允许俄罗斯官员监视美国空军储存核弹的基地？

 

Russia’s acceptance of a one-year New START extension and a declaration to freeze warhead levels is a significant compromise from its previous offer to unconditionally extend the treaty by five years with no warhead freeze.

俄罗斯接受一项为期一年的新《削减战略武器条约》延期和宣布冻结弹头水平的承诺，与此前提出的无条件冻结弹头无条件延长该条约五年的提议相比，是一个重大的妥协。

 

The Trump administration’s “offer” of a one-year extension of New START and a one-year warhead freeze with no verification at the outset represents an astounding walk-back from its previous statements. Trump has repeatedly called New START a “bad deal” and the whole point of the talks was to “fix” what the administration claimed was inadequate verification, incorporate Russia’s new strategic weapons into the agreement, and get China onboard. And how many times have we heard that you can’t trust Russia because they violate every arms control agreement they have signed? Yet here we are. None of those “fixes” are attached to the one-year treaty extension and the administration now says it is willing to sign on to a warhead freeze without agreed verification measures with the Great Cheater.

特朗普政府“提议”将新《削减战略武器条约》延长一年，并将弹头冻结一年，而一开始就没有进行任何核实，这表明了是特朗普此前声明的令人震惊的退步。特朗普一再称“新《削减战略武器条约》”为“坏协议”，谈判的全部重点是“解决”美国政府声称的不充分核查，将俄罗斯的新战略武器纳入协议，并使中国加入。我们有多少次听说你不信任俄罗斯，因为它们违反了已签署的每项军备控制协议？但是我们在这里。这些“修正”都没有附在为期一年的条约延期上，美国政府现在表示愿意在没有与大作弊者达成一致的核实措施的情况下签署弹头冻结。

 

There is nothing wrong with trying to broaden arms control to other weapons categories and countries. We strongly support that. But the last-minute flurry and attempts to shorten extension strongly suggest that the Trump administration has been more focused on creating chaos and to appear tough on Moscow and Beijing than to create nuclear arms control progress. The one-year timeline unnecessarily constrains both countries and could well mean that they would be in pretty much the same situation one year from now.

试图将军备控制扩大到其他武器类别和国家没有错。我们坚决支持。 但是最后一刻的慌乱和试图缩短延期的尝试强烈表明，特朗普政府更注重于制造混乱，对莫斯科和北京表现出强硬，而不是创造核军备控制进展。一年的时间表不必要地限制了两国，并且很可能意味着一年后它们将处于几乎相同的状况。

 

The inconvenient fact is that New START is working as designed and keeps the vast majority of Russian and US strategic arsenals in check, prevents either country from uploading thousands of extra warheads onto their deployed missiles, and offers a modicum of predictability in an otherwise unpredictable world.

令人不安的事实是，新《削减战略武器条约》正在按计划运作，并控制着俄罗斯和美国绝大多数的战略武库，阻止任何一个国家向其部署的导弹上增加数千枚额外的弹头，并在一个原本不可预测的世界中提供了一点可预测性。

 

Additional background information:

其他背景信息：

 

Status of world nuclear forces, September 2020

United States nuclear forces, 2020

Russian nuclear forces, 2020

At 11th Hour, New START Data Reaffirms Importance of Extending Treaty

世界核力量状况，2020年9月

美国核力量，2020年

俄罗斯核力量，2020年

在最后一刻，新的《削减战略武器条约》数据重申了延长条约的重要性

 

This publication was made possible by generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

纽约卡内基公司、约翰·D·和凯瑟琳·T·麦克阿瑟基金会、新土地基金会、犁铧基金会和展望山基金会的慷慨捐助使本出版物得以出版。 所作的陈述和表达的观点仅由作者承担。