Electronic Weapons: Space Force Gets New Toys-CCS

电子武器：美国太空部队获得新玩具-反通信系统

Date:2020-04-08 Source:strategypage By:Globalmil Viewed:

美国太空部队成员与CCS天线合影 来源：互联网

April 8, 2020: The U.S. recently established a sixth military service, the Space Force. The Air Force and other American defense organizations are transferring existing weapons systems that are suitable for the new service. One of these is an upgraded (in 2014) version of CCS (Counter Communications System) the air force has been using since 2004 as a ground-based satellite communications jamming system. With CCS version B10.2the United States has a satellite jammer comparable to systems used by other countries, especially Russia.
2020年4月8日：美国最近建立了第六个军事部门，即太空部队。空军和其他美国国防组织正在移交适用于这个新服役部门的现有武器系统。 其中之一是自2004年以来空军一直使用的反通信系统（CCS，Counter Communications System）的升级版。 在CCS的B10.2版本中，美国的卫星干扰器可与其他国家（尤其是俄罗斯）使用的系统相媲美。

Russian systems were something of mystery. But since 2014 many EW (electronic warfare) devices have been used in eastern Ukraine and Syria for testing “under combat conditions.” This is a unique opportunity to discover weaknesses, fix them and then promote export sales with a “combat proven” item. Equipment still in development is also tested. One example of that was the truck mounted Tirada-2 orbital jamming system that showed up during early 2019 in eastern Ukraine. Tirada-2 was there help to hack the control signals and video feeds from American RQ-4B Global Hawk UAVs that regularly operate over eastern Ukraine. A successful hack would provide a look at what these UAVs see when they monitor Russian activity. Some RQ-4Bs are equipped with “space satellite quality” electronic sensors and the Russians were hoping to get an opportunity to monitor and perhaps hack those systems. Ukrainian and Western intelligence was aware of the existence of Tirada-2 if only because a less capable export model was being offered for sale. But now the more capable non-export Tirada-2 showed up in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas), As one would expect, no one provided any details of who has been able to do what to whom.
俄罗斯系统是个谜。但是自2014年以来，许多EW（电子战）设备已在乌克兰东部和叙利亚用于“作战条件下”进行测试。这是发现，修复缺陷，然后通过“经过作战证明”的产品促进出口销售的独特机会。还在开发中的设备也经过了测试。一个例子是卡车安装的Tirada-2型卫星干扰系统，该系统于2019年初在乌克兰东部出现。Tirada-2型在这里帮助入侵经常在乌克兰东部飞行的美国RQ-4B全球鹰无人机的控制信号和视频信号。成功的黑客攻击将使人们了解这些无人机在监视俄罗斯活动时会看到什么。一些RQ-4B配备了“太空卫星品质”的电子传感器，俄罗斯希望有机会监视甚至入侵这些系统。乌克兰和西方情报机构意识到了Tirada-2型的存在，如果仅仅因为是一个能力较弱的正在出售出口版本。但现在，如人们所料，在乌克兰东部（顿巴斯，Donbas）出现了能力更强的非出口型Tirada-2，没有人提供任何细节，说明谁能够对谁做什么。

It’s not that the threat was ignored or underestimated. Officially the hacker threat is taken very seriously by media companies, especially those who broadcast via satellite. Starting in the late 1990s, growing reliance on data networks and satellite distribution of programming resulted in more and more attacks on these networks by groups seeking to get some attention by briefly seizing control of or shutting down these systems.
并不是说威胁被忽视或低估了。官方称，黑客威胁被媒体公司，特别是那些通过卫星广播的媒体公司非常重视。从20世纪90年代末开始，越来越依赖数据网络和卫星节目分配，导致越来越多的组织试图通过短暂地控制或关闭这些系统来获得一些关注，从而对这些网络发动攻击。

After 2000 the increasing number of incidents of space satellites being "hacked" was believed to be largely the result of an increase in the number of satellites up there, and the number of ground stations broadcasting information up into the sky. Many of these early "hacks" turned out to be satellite signals interfering with one another. Same with cases where people believe their GPS or satellite communications signals were being jammed. On further investigation, the real reasons tend to be less interesting and a lot more technical. All this usually had a large element of human error mixed in. But some of the disruptions were deliberate.
2000年以后，人们认为太空卫星被“黑客攻击”的事件数量增加，主要是由于那里的卫星数量增加以及地面向空中广播信息的地面站数量增加所致。许多早期的“黑客”被证明是卫星信号相互干扰。同样的情况下，人们认为其GPS或卫星通信信号被干扰。 在进一步的调查中，真正的原因往往不那么有趣，技术性更强。 所有这些通常都混入了很大的人为错误因素。但是其中一些破坏是故意的。

If you have the proper passwords and security information, you can send commands to the satellite and do whatever you want. Russian EW developers watched all this with great interest and considered the possibility of improving and “weaponizing” these hacking capabilities.
如果你有正确的密码和安全信息，你可以向卫星发送命令，做任何你想做的事情。俄罗斯电子战开发者非常感兴趣地关注这一切，并考虑改进和“武器化”这些黑客能力的可能性。

All of the accidental jammings demonstrated to hackers how easy it was to do it on purpose. There were a growing number of examples of that. In response, the U.S. Air Force has long (decades) been developing electronic tools for attacking and defending satellite communications, and the satellites operators themselves were already training people to attack and defend space satellites. This effort involved figuring out new or improved ways to jam satellites. Then you keep that stuff secret, in case potential enemies have not figured this out themselves. Next, you work on ways to defeat the weapons developed. Most of this is playing around with the signals. You can unjam a jamming signal with another signal. However, a lot of trial and error is required, and you want to get that done way in advance of any actual war. When you do have to use this stuff for real, you have to expect that the enemy may well have come up with some angle you missed. Thus there will be some rapid improvisation, and you will have more time and resources for this if you have worked out, ahead of time, the details of disasters you have already anticipated. No one releases much information about this, for obvious reasons. There isn't much discussion from any government unless there is a terrorist attack using these techniques. Now that has happened in a very public fashion, and it was done using clever and determined hacking of the ground-based networks that control the programming and the satellites.
所有的意外干扰都向黑客表明了有意这样做的难易程度。越来越多的例子。作为回应，美国空军长期（数十年）一直在开发用于攻击和防御卫星通信的电子工具，并且卫星运营商本身已经在训练人们攻击和防御太空卫星。这项工作涉及找出干扰卫星的新方法或改进方法。然后，你可以将这些信息保密，以防潜在的敌人自己搞清楚。接下来，你将研究击败已开发武器的方法。大多数情况是在与信号打交道。你可以用另一个信号解除干扰信号。需要进行大量的尝试和错误，并且你想在任何实际战争之前就将其解决。当你真的要用这些东西的时候，你必须预料到敌人可能会想出一些你错过的角度。因此，会有一些快速的即兴创作，如果你提前计算出你已经预料到的灾难细节，你将有更多的时间和资源来完成。出于明显的原因，没有人发布关于这方面的很多信息，除非有使用这些技术的恐怖袭击，否则任何政府都不会进行过多讨论。现在，这已经以非常公开的方式发生了，并且它是通过对控制程序和卫星的地面网络进行巧妙而果断的黑客攻击来完成的。

There have been few additional efforts like this, mainly because it was obvious that you could not easily hide a jammer. Satellite broadcasters also took measures to make such jamming much more difficult to do. There were also efforts to improve defense against hackers, but for TV5 the defenses were not robust enough.
几乎没有其他类似的工作，主要是因为很明显你不能轻易隐藏干扰机。卫星广播公司也采取措施，使这种干扰更加困难。也努力提高防御黑客，但对TV5的防御不够强大。

Russia quietly worked on ways to not only hack satellite control and data signals but to easily eavesdrop and monitor them. Encrypted signals can be decrypted and if you can do that you do not talk about it. But now the Russian satellite signal monitoring and hacking equipment is coming out of the development shadows and practicing on American equipment.
俄罗斯悄无声息地致力于不仅窃听卫星控制和数据信号，而且容易窃听和监视它们的方法。加密的信号可以被解密，如果你能做到，你就不会谈论它。但现在俄罗斯卫星信号监测和黑客设备正摆脱发展阴影，在美国设备上进行实践。
 
 补充资料：
1、关于美国太空部队
美国太空部队成立于2019年12月20日，第一个掌门人是约翰·杰伊·雷蒙德四星上将。太空部队是继陆军、空军、海军、海军陆战队和海岸警卫队之后的美军第6大军种，但是在指挥系统上隶属于空军部长。美国太空部队是在特朗普的力主之下成立的，而主要的系统架构和运营模式则由美国宇航局提供建议。

 
2、北京时间2020年3月27日凌晨，一枚被称为AEHF-6的极高频通信卫星在佛罗里达州卡纳维拉尔角的联合发射联盟（ULA）阿特拉斯V火箭上发射升空。该通信卫星由洛克希德·马丁公司研制，隶属于刚刚成立不久的美国太空部队，在2010-2019年间先后发射了5枚，此次发射，是该通信卫星系统的第6枚，也是最后一枚。AEHF通信卫星被部署在36000公里的地球静止轨道上，为美国军方及其盟友提供全天候的加密通信服务。
 

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