Future warfighting will be global to the point that planning for individual theater campaigns will be counterproductive. Successful warfighters will have to see the battlespace as a singularity, both geographically and with regard to the elements of national power-economic, military, political and informational. Putting together plans that account for these elements across a global stage is clearly in the realm of strategy, not classical operational art. Like the bayonet charge, operational art will become a relic-but one that some will not want to leave behind. Tactics will link (and must link) directly to strategy.

未来的作战将是全球性的对点作战，针对单个战场进行的战役规划将无法达到预期的目标。成功的战斗者将必需把综合国力的因素——经济、军事、政治、以及新闻信息——和地理因素一样当成是作战空间的一部分。将两个方案放到一起，从全球范围审视了这些因素的是从战略领域的那个方案，而不是从经典作战艺术出发的那一个。正比如刺刀冲锋一样，作战艺术将成为历史——成为某些人不愿抛弃的东西。战术将直接关联（也必须直接关联）到战略。

Warfare has always been among the most intense of human activities, but when warriors engaged in the drama of battle were isolated from the rest of society, common citizens experienced the violence only through books, paintings or the occasional letter from the front. With the advent of modern communications, the war has spilled over into the parlor. Cell phones, media, video, digital photography and the Internet have combined to bring at least some of the horror of battle to the home front for all to see. More than just a cultural curiosity, this phenomenon has deep political implications. This trend that began in earnest during the Vietnam conflict will grow to fruition in the near future.

战争从来都是人类最为激烈的活动之一，但是当战士们在战争舞台上交锋的时候又是与社会的其它部分相脱离的，普通平民只能从书籍、绘画或者是偶尔来自前线的信件体验战争。随着现代通讯手段的进步，战争开始在客厅里泛滥。移动电话，新闻传媒，视频，数码照片以及互联网至少都在把战场恐怖的一面带到后方为人们所了解。除了一种文化上的猎奇之外，这种现象还有着深刻的政治意味。这种在越南战争期间变得突出的趋式将在不远的将来开花结果。

Because warfare will tend to resolve into small scale (but high-amplitude) actions, the contributions of individual soldiers will count for more. As in the past, the most lethal weapon on the battlefield will be the soldier/leader who is fit, resolute, disciplined and skilled. Along with the requisite courage to fight, this soldier will have to demonstrate an unprecedented level of innovation and creativity in order to adapt to an ever-changing, complex situation.

正因为战争将试图在小范围（但却是高烈度）的行动内解决问题，单个士兵的作用将变得更大。在过去，战场上最致命的武器是合格、坚定、守纪律并且专业技能熟练的士兵及指挥官。除了必不可少的战斗勇气之外，这样的战士还不得不具有空前程度的变革、创新意识以便于适应一个不断变化的、复杂的环境。

This complexity is mostly the product of American firepower. The destructive yield of our weapons and munitions not only destroys enemy troops and equipment, it also chases the enemy off of open terrain into close terrain-- the infamous "dark places." It forces the enemy to abandon formations and high-frequency (predictable) warfare in favor of dispersion and low-frequency (less predictable), high-amplitude warfare. It leads the enemy to surround himself with noncombatants to be used as a political shield against our fires. Americans cringe with disgust at such practices, partly from a sense of moral repugnance, and partly from frustration at the effectiveness of such tactics.

这种复杂性很有可能是美军火力的产物。我们武器和装备的杀伤力量不仅仅能够消灭敌人的部队和装备，而且还能够从开放地域到封闭地形——即恶名昭著的“阴暗角落”——追击敌人。这迫使敌人放弃编组和高频度（可以预计的）战争转而投入离散和低频度（更难预计的）、高烈度的战争。它导致敌人使用非作战人员将自己围起来作为政治盾牌以抵御我们的火力打击。美国在面对这样的令人不齿的场景时踌躇不前，一部分是因为道德观念上的顾虑，一部分也是针对这样的战术缺乏有效的应对手段。

If we intend to project combat power into the complex battlespace of the future, we must shift our focus from the relative simplicity of mass, armored warfare into the challenge of post-Jominian, formationless, distributed operations. We must cease thinking of the dark places-cities, mountains, jungles-as tough problems and instead learn to view them as opportunities for creative maneuver. Field Marshal William Slim in Burma made this kind of mental leap when he learned to find and exploit the advantages of jungle warfare and turned the tables on the Japanese. For him and his forces, the jungle was transformed from a feared obstacle into an advantage.

如果我们想要在未来的复杂作战空间投放我们的作战力量，我们必须把我们相对简单的集群、装甲作战转变到应对后约米尼时代不讲阵形、分布式作战的挑战上来。我们必须停止有关把“阴暗角落”——即城市、山区、丛林——当成是大麻烦的思维转而学会把它们当成是进行创造性机动的机会。陆军元帅威廉姆·斯利姆在缅甸学习发现和探索丛林带来的便利后实现了这种思维的跳跃，成功扭转了对日本人的劣势。对他和他的部队来说，丛林从令人害怕的障碍变成了一种可以利用的优势。

Complexity in the battlespace demands that we shift focus from attrition-based mass to purpose-based distribution, from apocalyptic, episodic fires to high-fidelity, continuous sensors and from deliberate risk aversion to informed risk-taking. We cannot continue to build and train the force for the central battle in Europe when the future is unfolding in the mountains of Asia, the jungles of Africa and the cities of the world.

作战空间的复杂性要求我们将焦点从立足于消耗大规模作战转变到立足于实现目标的分布式作战，从世界末日式的短暂火力转变到高保真的、持续不断的监测，从谨慎地避免冒险到有准备的承担风险。我们不能够在亚洲山区、非洲丛林以及世界各个城市的未来还不明朗的情况下不停地为欧洲主战场组建和训练部队。

We will know that we have graduated into an understanding of modern warfare when our leadership culture comes to view complexity and chaos not as a problem, but as an opportunity.

我们相信当我们的主流文化不再把复杂和混乱看成是一个问题，而是一个机会时，我们将对现代战争有一个全面彻底的理解。

The most visible change that must occur in the Army of the early 21st century is the move to small force theory. In fact, the Army's delay in getting there is becoming a palpable roadblock to the future. Instead of inching cautiously away from divisions and corps, we should be leaping toward brigade-sized battle groups that are born joint rather than retrofitted. The small force of the future-- fast, flexible and attended by a pillar of cloud and fire (that is, joint fires) wherever they go-must become the principal expression of Army combat power.

最能够被观察到的21世纪初期陆军一定会出现的变化就是朝着小型化军队的方向发展。实际上，陆军在向这个方向发展上的拖延正在成为通往未来的一个路障。我们不应该在从师级到军级这样的单位上斤斤计较，而是应该跳跃进入天生适合联合作战的不用推倒从来的旅级战斗群。未来的小型化军队——快速、灵活、无论在哪都能够得到天空和炮火支援（也就是联合打击火力）——必定会成为陆军战斗力的主要组织方式。

The small force must be as familiar with its joint partners as it is with gunnery tables. The commander of the small force must be trained to master both tactics and grand strategy because he will operate simultaneously in both worlds (although he can forget about operational art, which will become a meaningless term). The small force will forego the movement to contact (an operation designed for blind men trying to figure out the elephant) in favor of high-speed, destructive raids. Leaders of the small force will stop studying the Battle of the Bulge and read about James (Jeb) Stuart's ride around George McClellan instead. The small force will excel in deep maneuvers into vulnerable enemy territory, with the hope that the enemy will give chase and surround it. Like Jan Zizka's wagenburg during the Hussite Revolution, the small force prefers to be encircled so that it can unleash all of its destructive power on enemy armed forces and then finish them off with a counterattack. Wherever the small force goes, it is a touchstone for grand strategy, shocking joint fires and tactical overmatch.

小型化军队必须象熟知射击表尺一样熟悉其联合作战的伙伴。小型化军队的指挥官必须通过训练掌握战术及全局战略，因为他将在同时在这两个领域里作战（尽管他可以忘掉作战艺术这个没有实际意义的词条）。小型化军队将在向敌接触机动（这是一种相当于瞎子摸象的行动）之前采取高速的毁灭性的袭击。小型化军队的指挥官们将不再研究突出部战役而改为学习詹姆斯·（杰布）斯图尔特追击乔治·麦克莱伦。小型化军队在深入易受攻击的敌方境内机动方面有优势，敌人总是希望能够追击并包围它。正如捷克胡斯运动革命期间约翰·杰士卡在瓦更伯格做表现的那样，小型化军队更喜欢被包围以便其能够向敌人的装甲部队释放所有的毁灭性火力并随之发起反击加以消灭。无论小型化军队出现在哪里，它都是大战略、联合打击火力以及以弱胜强战术的一块试金石。

One of the greatest challenges for American strategists in the early 21st century will be legal reform. Heretofore we have reclined in a belief that legal matters-international law, Geneva/Hague, rules of engagement and dealing with enemy combatants after capture-were matters for lawyers and judges. In fact, to adapt a famous quote, "Law is too important to be left to lawyers." Law is part of strategy. Watching the war on terror unfold, it is obvious that our laws and international agreements are seriously lagging behind, adrift in anachronism and effete ideology.

21世纪初期美国战略家们的最大挑战之一可能就是重新立法。时至今日我们已经依赖于这样一种信仰即法律问题——国际法，日内瓦公约／海牙法庭，交战守则以及敌方被俘人员的处置——是律师和法官们的事情。事实上，正如一句名言所讲的那样，“正因为法律是如此重要所以不能仅仅交给律师。”法律是战略的一个组成部分。看一看反恐战争的进程就知道，很明显我们的法律和国际协议都严重扯了后腿，充满了意识形态的痕迹和与时代的不相容。

Like bacteria that have become resistant to penicillin, modern opponents of the United States have adapted themselves to our laws. Indeed, while our military, political and economic strengths are feared and admired, our legal system has become a laughingstock, a tool for the enemy. American culture must shake itself from the idea that legal precedent is the end-all and be-all of law and evolve with the times. Grand strategy's embrace includes legal issues, and if we ignore those issues and refuse to adapt, our strategy will not prevail.

就像细菌会对青霉素产生抗药性一样，现代化的美国敌人也已经适应了我们的法律。事实如此，当我们的军事、政治以及经济力量受到敬畏和钦慕时，我们的立法系统正在成为笑柄，正在成为敌人手中的工具。美国文化必须从法律以判例原则为中心的理想化当中自我猛醒并与时俱进。大战略的怀抱包括法律的话题，如果我们忽视这些课题并拒绝调整，我们的战略将无法成功。

In short, we must take a grand strategic view, not only an ideological view, concerning law. In the end, the law must provide for the rapid destruction of terror if we intend to deter future adversaries.

简而言之，对于法律，我们必须采取一个大战略的观点，而不仅仅是从意识形态的角度出发。最终，如果我们希望阻止未来的敌人，就必须提供能够快速消灭恐怖分子的法律。

These, then, are the emerging factors of early 21st century warfare-from an American point of view. When styles of conflict have changed throughout history, kingdoms, empires and nations have been faced with the difficult task of adapting or dying. The jury is still out on this latest set of changes, but if we shrink from grasping the future and instead long for the glory of the past, our efforts will be doomed and others will rise to power.

这也就是21世纪初期的战争正在出现的几个要素——从美国的角度出发的观点。当冲突的形式在历史过程中发生变化的过程中，王国、帝国还有国家都曾经面临着有关变革或者是死亡的艰难抉择。评委们在最近一次的变革中依然缺席，但如果我们害怕抓住未来而代之以渴望过去的辉煌，我们将走上不归之路，别人将取代我们在世界上崛起。

Standing over the grave of Frederick the Great, Napoleon is reported to have observed that had the king been alive, the French could not have prevailed over Prussia. In fact it was not the passing of a great tactician that doomed Prussia, but rather the collective failure to adapt to the realities of 19th-century strategy. What the Prussians learned through failure at Jena-Auerstadt, let us hope we can learn through clarity of thought and professional debate.

当站在腓特烈大帝的墓穴前时，拿破仑据说感受到了大帝永生，法国人无法征服普鲁士。事实上普鲁士的消亡并不是因为一个伟大的战术家的逝去，而是没有能够主动适应19世纪的战略现实。普鲁士通过在耶那-阿尔斯泰特的失败获取了教训，让我们祝愿我们能够通过清晰的思维和自由的辩论来赢得同样的前进动力。

By Lt. Col. Robert R. Leonhard 作者：罗伯特.R.里恩哈德　中校U.S. Army retired LT. COL. ROBERT R. LEONHARD, USA Ret., formerly taught military science at West Virginia University. He is a writer and consultant and has published many articles and several books on military strategy and land warfare.

罗伯特.R.里恩哈德，美军退役中校，曾在西弗吉尼亚大学教军事科学的课程，他是一名作家和顾问，发表过许多关于军事战略和陆战的文章和若干本书。