By Wilson Beaver and Jim Fein

作者：威尔逊·比弗和吉姆·费恩

 

Staff Sgt. Trevor Glass and Airman Joseph Boik secure a Joint Direct Attack Munition onto an F-16 fighter at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, on Aug. 16, 2020. (Senior Airman Mya M. Crosby/U.S. Air Force)

2020年8月16日，在韩国群山空军基地，上士特雷弗·格拉斯和飞行员约瑟夫·博伊克将一枚联合直接攻击弹药固定在一架F-16战斗机上。（高级飞行员Mya M.Crosby/美国空军）

 

In early 2023, the U.S. transferred 300,000 155mm artillery shells from its War Reserve Material stockpile in Israel to Ukraine. At the time, it was the only conflict with heavy U.S. involvement. After Hamas’s Oct. 7 terrorist attack, that’s no longer true.

2023年初，美国从其在以色列的战争储备物资库中向乌克兰转移了30万枚155毫米炮弹。当时，这是唯一一场有美国大量参与的冲突。在哈马斯10月7日的恐怖袭击之后，情况不再如此。

 

Now, Israel too has requested munitions, putting a strain on already stretched U.S. stockpiles and calling into question both the Defense Department’s munitions planning and the budgetary priorities of congressional appropriators. The U.S. military is already tasked to do more than it has been equipped to do. At present, our armed forces do not have the munitions needed for a contingency in the Indo-Pacific region, and we certainly aren’t producing enough munitions to sustain operations in all three theaters at once.

现在，以色列也要求提供弹药，这给已经紧张的美国库存带来了压力，并对国防部的弹药规划和国会拨款者的预算优先事项提出了质疑。美国军方的任务已经超出了它的能力。目前，我们的武装部队没有在印太地区应急所需的弹药，我们当然也没有生产足够的弹药来同时维持所有三个战区的行动。

 

For example, Ukraine is expending between 110,000 155mm shells per month, with a stated minimum need to fire 356,400 shells per month, and a desire to be able to shoot 594,000 shells per month.

例如，乌克兰每月消耗110000枚155毫米炮弹，据称每月至少需要发射356400枚炮弹，并希望每月能够发射594000枚炮弹。

 

Even after doubling shell production, the U.S. produces only 28,000 per month. That means Ukraine’s current 155mm shell expenditure outstrips U.S. monthly production by a multiple of about 3.6.

即使在炮弹产量翻了一番之后，美国每月的产量也只有2.8万枚。这意味着乌克兰目前的155毫米炮弹消耗比美国的月产量高出约3.6倍。

 

Adding to the problem is Israel’s request for 155mm shells from the United States. But with U.S. global stockpiles severely depleted by the war in Ukraine, it remains to be seen where the Pentagon can find shells for Israel without diverting shells bound for Ukraine.

以色列要求美国提供155毫米炮弹，这使问题更加严重。但由于乌克兰战争严重耗尽了美国的全球库存，五角大楼在何处可以为以色列找到炮弹，而不转移运往乌克兰的炮弹，还有待观察。

 

Poor munitions planning on the part of both the Pentagon and congressional appropriators could mean at least some of the Pacific theater’s War Reserve Material stockpile could be transferred, weakening U.S. capabilities for contingency situations in the Indo-Pacific. This hardly makes sense when the National Defense Strategy has identified China as the primary challenge to the United States.

五角大楼和国会拨款方糟糕的弹药规划可能意味着太平洋战区的战争储备物资储备至少有一部分可能会被转移，从而削弱美国应对印太地区紧急情况的能力。当《国防战略》将中国确定为对美国的主要挑战时，这几乎没有意义。

 

But the Pentagon’s shortfall in artillery shells isn’t the only munitions planning issue. Israel has also requested precision-guided munitions such as Small Diameter Bombs and Joint Direct Attack Munitions. The U.S. has promised to deliver both, but it’s unclear how that can be done without inhibiting overall U.S. capacity for other contingency situations. According to procurement documents, fiscal 2022 U.S. purchases of Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Small Diameter Bombs totaled only approximately 3,000 and 2,000, respectively.

但五角大楼的炮弹短缺并不是唯一的弹药规划问题。以色列还要求提供精确制导弹药，如小口径炸弹和联合直接攻击弹药。美国已承诺同时提供这两种服务，但尚不清楚如何在不影响美国应对其他应急情况的总体能力的情况下做到这一点。根据采购文件，2022财年美国对联合直接攻击弹药和小直径炸弹的采购总额分别约为3000枚和2000枚。

 

That’s fewer JDAMs and SDMs in a year than Israel used in six days. And FY23 procurements don’t make the situation much better.

这比以色列在六天内使用的JDAM和SDM要少。而FY23的采购并没有让情况好转多少。

 

Beyond the Pentagon’s past failures in munitions planning, its future planning might be even more worrying. Wargames have repeatedly shown that the U.S. will run out of critical munitions only eight days into a high-intensity conflict with China over Taiwan.

除了五角大楼过去在弹药规划方面的失败之外，其未来的规划可能更令人担忧。战争演习一再表明，美国与中国在台湾问题上发生高强度冲突仅八天，关键弹药就会耗尽。

 

Ukrainian servicemen load a French TRF-1 155mm weapon prior to firing at Russian positions on March 27, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images)

2023年3月27日，在俄罗斯军事打击乌克兰期间，乌克兰军人在向俄罗斯阵地开火之前，装载了一枚法国TRF-1 155毫米武器。（阿里斯·梅西尼斯/法新社通过盖蒂图片社）

 

The Navy’s annual procurement of Tomahawk missiles and MK 48 torpedoes, for example, falls woefully short of the needs of the fleet. If all 73 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are available, the Navy’s FY22 procurement of 70 Tomahawks only allows each to launch 0.96 Tomahawks. If all 22 Virginia-class submarines were available, the 58 MK 48 torpedoes procured by the Navy that fiscal year would not fill their 88 torpedo tubes even once.

例如，海军每年采购的战斧导弹和MK 48鱼雷远远达不到舰队的需求。如果所有73艘阿利·伯克级驱逐舰都可用，那么海军在2022财年采购的70艘战斧只允许每艘发射0.96枚战斧。如果所有22艘弗吉尼亚级潜艇都可用，那么海军在该财政年度采购的58枚MK 48鱼雷将不会装满88个鱼雷发射管一次。

 

Dipping into U.S. military inventory does not make the situation much better. An educated guess is that there are about 4,000 Tomahawks in the Navy’s possession. If 20% of the vertical launching system cells in the U.S. surface fleet and 100% of the VLS cells in the submarine fleet are equipped with Tomahawks, and if 80% of the U.S. surface fleet, 60% of U.S. attack submarines and 33% of U.S. strategic submarines are deployable in a conflict, then the Navy can fire roughly 2,300 Tomahawks without reloading.

动用美国的军事库存并不能使情况好转。一个有根据的猜测是，海军拥有大约4000枚战斧。如果美国水面舰队中20%的垂直发射系统单元和潜艇舰队中100%的VLS单元配备了战斧，如果80%的美国水面舰队、60%的美国攻击潜艇和33%的美国战略潜艇可在冲突中部署，那么海军可以在不重新装载的情况下发射大约2300枚战斧。

 

In sum, the Navy’s Tomahawk inventory is so low that it likely can’t reload all its ships even once.

总的来说，海军的战斧库存非常低，甚至一次都无法重新装载所有舰艇。

 

The situation is the same with most other munitions. Previously produced Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles total only about 3,000, not taking into account the hundreds already spent in combat. And the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile inventory likely does not exceed 120.

大多数其他弹药的情况也是如此。此前生产的联合空对地防区外导弹总数仅约3000枚，这还不包括已经投入战斗的数百枚。远程反舰导弹的库存可能不会超过120枚。

 

The U.S. military’s current mission is dependent on deterrence and delivery of munitions to allies. Its projected failure to do enough of the latter surely undermines the former in the minds of Chinese military planners.

美军目前的任务取决于威慑和向盟友运送弹药。它预计在后者方面做得不够，这肯定会破坏中国军事规划者心目中的前者。

 

It could get even worse: A fundamental precept of war is its unpredictability in both timing and contours.

情况可能会变得更糟：战争的一个基本原则是其时间和轮廓的不可预测性。

 

America is preparing for a conflict with China over Taiwan, but North Korea could decide to invade South Korea at any time — and the most dangerous window might be while the U.S. is engaged in a war over Taiwan. The United States has treaty obligations to help South Korea defend itself, and expending munitions in such a war would further endanger America’s capacity to fight China.

美国正在为与中国在台湾地区问题上的冲突做准备，但朝鲜随时可能决定入侵韩国——最危险的窗口可能是美国在台湾地区问题上进行战争。美国有条约义务帮助韩国自卫，在这样的战争中消耗弹药将进一步危及美国对抗中国的能力。

 

Frederick the Great once said that when you defend everything, you defend nothing. With U.S. attention fixated on supplying Ukraine with munitions needed for its war with Russia, and a probable continuation of violence in the Middle East, the U.S. risks being drawn into fights in three regions at the same time. This will be more than the U.S. can manage with its current munitions stores.

腓特烈大帝曾经说过，当你捍卫一切时，你什么也捍卫不了。随着美国的注意力集中在向乌克兰提供其与俄罗斯战争所需的弹药上，以及中东暴力可能持续，美国有可能同时卷入三个地区的战斗。这将超出美国现有军火库的管理能力。

 

It is more important than ever to prioritize use based on grand strategy and national interest, and to rework munitions acquisition and production plans to deter threats to America’s most vital interests.

现在比以往任何时候都更重要的是，要根据大战略和国家利益优先考虑使用，并重新制定弹药采购和生产计划，以遏制对美国最重要利益的威胁。

 

As others have written, the first step in fixing America’s long-term munitions problem is the increased use of multiyear procurement authorities for munitions across the board. The use of multiyear contracts sends a long-term demand signal to industry that enables the defense-industrial base to both expand and quicken production of these munitions.

正如其他人所写，解决美国长期弹药问题的第一步是全面增加对弹药的多年采购权限。多年合同的使用向工业界发出了一个长期的需求信号，使国防工业基地能够扩大和加快这些弹药的生产。

 

Likewise, multiyear buys have consistently been shown to decrease costs over time, resulting in a positive outcome both for the military and for the American taxpayer. To its credit, this fiscal year’s National Defense Authorization Act approves six new munitions for multiyear procurement, but this funding ultimately still depends on congressional appropriators, who still haven’t fully funded the multiyear procurement of munitions authorized in last year’s NDAA.

同样，多年购买一直被证明可以随着时间的推移降低成本，这对军队和美国纳税人都产生了积极的影响。值得称赞的是，本财政年度的《国防授权法案》批准了六种新的弹药进行多年采购，但这笔资金最终仍取决于国会拨款人，他们仍未完全拨发资金给去年《国防授权法》授权的弹药的多年采购。

 

Wilson Beaver, a former Senate staffer and U.S. Army veteran, is the senior policy analyst for defense budgeting at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense. Jim Fein is a former member of the think tank’s Young Leaders Program.

威尔逊·比弗是前参议院工作人员和美国陆军老兵，是传统基金会国防中心国防预算的高级政策分析师。吉姆·费恩是该智库青年领袖项目的前成员。