For military spending to counter China, PDI tells only a small part of the story

外媒:对于用于对抗中国的军费开支,PDI只讲述了其中的一小部分

Date:2022-04-22 Source:breakingdefense By: ELAINE MCCUSKER Viewed:

Lawmakers and taxpayers should know PDI is not reflective of the defense investment to counter the pacing challenge of China, AEI's Elaine McCusker writes.
美国企业研究所 (AEI)的伊莱恩·麦卡斯克(Elaine McCusker)写道,立法者和纳税人应该知道,“太平洋威慑计划”(PDI)并不能反映为应对中国“步步紧逼的挑战”(pacing challenge)而进行的国防投资。
 
By   ELAINE MCCUSKER
on April 21, 2022
伊莱恩·麦卡斯克
2022年4月21日
 

he Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group transits the Pacific Ocean Jan. 25, 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jason Isaacs)
西奥多·罗斯福号航母攻击群于2020年1月25日驶越太平洋。(大众传播专家海军中士杰森·艾萨克斯拍摄的美国海军照片)
 
In recent years the Pentagon marked out a pot of money, known as the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, to highlight key projects needed to counter China in the region. But in the op-ed below, AEI’s Elaine McCusker argues that at best the PDI represents an incomplete picture of China-related spending, and warns that it could mislead lawmakers and the public.
近年来,五角大楼拨出一笔资金,称为“太平洋威慑倡议”,以强调在该地区对抗中国所需的关键项目。但在下面的专栏文章中,美国企业研究所 (AEI)的伊莱恩·麦卡斯克(Elaine McCusker)认为,“太平洋威慑计划”(PDI)充其量只能代表与中国有关的支出的不完整情况,并警告说,它可能误导立法者和公众。
 
As the Defense Department prepares to release its detailed fiscal year 2023 budget justifications, including additional program descriptions for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), policymakers will want to know what is included to stand up to the China threat and, most importantly, is it enough? The short answer: The defense investment to counter China is much broader than PDI, an incomplete metric at best.
随着美国防部准备发布其详细的2023财年预算理由,包括对“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI)的额外计划描述,决策者将想知道包括哪些内容以抵御中国的威胁,最重要的是,它是足够?简短的回答:对抗中国的国防投资比PDI更广泛,充其量其是一个不完整的指标。
 
No one doubts the importance of deterrence and military capability to counter China. It is necessary to posture aggressively in the Pacific and for lawmakers and taxpayers to hold the Defense Department accountable for doing so. And while oversight tools are important for the direction and accountability they instill, PDI falls short of its intent and misleads policymakers and U.S. partners about America’s overall investment [PDF] in Pacific deterrence, and in what is being done to confront China as the key strategic competitor and pacing challenge.
没有人怀疑威慑和军事能力对抗中国的重要性。必须在太平洋地区采取积极姿态,立法者和纳税人必须让国防部为此负责。尽管监督工具对它们灌输的方向和责任感很重要,但“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI)没有达到其目的,在美国在太平洋威慑方面的总体投资以及在应对中国作为关键战略竞争对手和挑战方面误导了决策者和美国伙伴。
 
To fully identify gaps or inform needed discussions and decisions regarding the China challenge, PDI should be abandoned for a fuller and deeper assessment of Defense investments including plans for future programs.
为了充分发现差距,或为有关中国挑战的必要讨论和决策提供信息,应放弃“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI),对国防投资进行更全面、更深入的评估,包括未来项目的计划。
 
The PDI was created by Congress in the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act [PDF] to reassure partners and prioritize activities in the Indo-Pacific region. The fiscal 2022 legislation [PDF] requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), to submit an independent assessment of planned and resourced activities to maintain or restore the comparative military advantage of the United States with respect to China.
“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI)是由国会在FY 2021国防授权法案中创建的,以保证合作伙伴和在印度-太平洋地区的活动的优先次序。2022财年立法要求国防部长在与美国印太司令部(INDOPACOM)指挥官协商后,提交一份独立评估报告,评估计划和资源活动,以维持或恢复美国在中国方面的相对军事优势。
 
This year’s PDI assessment, submitted at the end of March and entitled “Seize the Initiative,” is classified. The unclassified summary, which is difficult to evaluate due to lack of detail on cost estimates and requested appropriations, indicates that deterring China in the Pacific has almost doubled in cost to $9 billion compared to last year’s $4.7 billion estimate from INDOPACOM. In addition, PDI would nearly triple in cost over the next five years from $22.7 billion projected in March 2021 to $67 billion noted in the new estimate.
今年3月底提交的“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI)评估题为“抓住主动权”,属于机密。由于缺乏有关成本估算和所需拨款的详细信息,难以评估的非机密摘要表明,在太平洋地区威慑中国的成本几乎翻了一番,达到90亿美元,而印度太平洋司令部去年的估算为47亿美元。此外,PDI将在未来五年内将成本提高近三倍,从2021年3月预计的227亿美元增至新估计中的670亿美元。
 
The assessment divides requirements into six categories, the largest of which makes up close to 78% of the PDI total in FY 2023 and would “modernize and strengthen presence” to “improve the lethality and combat credibility of the Joint Force west of the International Date Line.” Substantial investments would be devoted to capabilities that fully integrate the communications and firepower of the joint force.
该评估将需求分为六类,其中最大的一个占2023财年“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI)总数的近 78%,并将“现代化和加强存在”以“提高联合部队在国际日期变更线以西的杀伤力和作战可信度”大量投资将用于完全整合联合部队的通信和火力的能力。
 
We will have to see the appropriation and program details of PDI as the Department releases detailed budget justifications, but it seems safe to say that the initiative does not begin to capture the Department’s real level of investment in activities geared toward the China challenge.
随着国防部公布详细的预算理由,我们将不得不看到“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI)的拨款和项目细节,但可以肯定地说,该计划并未开始反映国防部在应对中国挑战的活动中的实际投资水平。
 
The Department’s FY 2023 budget request includes hundreds of billions focused in this area that are not included in the PDI. For example:
国防部2023财年的预算申请包括未包含在“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI)中的、专注于该领域的数千亿美元。例如:
 
·Adding just a few key procurement programs — Virginia Class Submarines ($7.3 billion), Arleigh Burke class destroyers ($5.6 billion), and Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles ($0.5 billion) — yields more than $13 billion for the China challenge.
仅增加几个关键采购项目——弗吉尼亚级潜艇(73 亿美元)、阿利伯克级驱逐舰(56 亿美元)和远程反舰导弹(5亿美元)——就为应对中国挑战创造了超过130亿美元的收益。
·Assuming that much of the Department’s science and technology efforts are focused on restoring U.S. competitiveness against China through military capability — including hypersonics, microelectronics, 5G, and artificial intelligence — adds another $16.5 billion.
假设国防部的大部分科技工作都集中在通过军事能力——包括高超音速、微电子、5G和人工智能——恢复美国对中国的竞争力上,这又增加了165亿美元。
·One could argue that nuclear modernization ($34.4 billion), space ($27.6 billion) and cyber ($11.2 billion) are at least partially geared toward deterring China.
有人可能会说,核现代化(344亿美元)、太空(276亿美元)和网络(112亿美元)至少部分是为了遏制中国。
·There are more investments in readiness, operations and military construction that are difficult to specifically quantify, yet also focus on China-related top strategic priorities. For example, portions of the $134.7 billion in readiness funding would go toward flying and steaming hours to prepare the force for integrated operations like those required to deter China.
在战备、作战和军事建设方面有更多难以具体量化的投资,但也侧重于与中国相关的最高战略重点。例如,1347亿美元的战备资金中的一部分将用于飞行和航行时间,为部队进行综合行动做好准备,例如威慑中国所需的那些。
 
So, what message is really being sent with the PDI request? And, why is it problematic? Artificial budget initiatives like PDI that separate only pieces of an overall effort are not a true signal of investment levels or priorities. Nor are they meaningful in evaluating progress or in making decisions.
那么,“太平洋威慑倡议”(PDI)请求真正发送的是什么消息?而且,为什么会出现问题?像PDI这样仅将整体工作的一部分分开的人为预算计划并不是投资水平或优先事项的真实信号。它们在评估进展或做出决定方面也没有意义。
 
Instead of binning the department’s budgets into initiatives like PDI, Congress should view the entire defense budget in this context and, if necessary, consider asking DOD for a comprehensive budget exhibit for all capabilities devoted to this effort. This would provide transparency to decision-makers by letting them clearly assess what the budget holds to counter China’s pacing threat.
国会不应该把部门预算纳入像PDI这样的倡议中,国会应该在这一背景下考虑整个国防预算,如果必要的话,考虑向国防部申请全面预算,以展示致力于这一努力的所有能力。这将为决策者提供透明度,让他们清楚地评估预算对应对中国威胁的作用。
 
Elaine McCusker is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a former Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
伊莱恩·麦卡斯克 (Elaine McCusker) 是美国企业研究所 (AEI) 的高级研究员,也是前国防部代理副部长 (审计长)。
 

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