TRAINING FACILITIES

训练基地

Seven facilities provide classroom and field training for 2nd Artillery Corps personnel. Six facilities are garrisons or launch areas providing hands-on training and missile launch capabilities. The seventh facility is the 2nd Artillery Corps Engineering School in Xian. The locations and identifications of the 2nd Artillery Corps' training facilities can be seen in the image below:

一些训练基地提供了对二炮官兵进行训练的教室和场地。有六个训练基地针对导弹部队或者是发射场，可以进行实际操作并具备导弹发射能力。第七个训练基地是位于西安的第二炮兵工程学院。已知的二炮部队训练基地的所在位置如下图所示

Many of the training facilities do not provide significant garrison areas, implying that they are manned by deployed units who arrive with their own equipment. This does not imply that crew training is not conducted at home garrison, but rather that a capability to field deploy and conduct training launches is available within the 2nd Artillery Corps. This is similar to the presence of dedicated training facilities for PLAAF SAM units. Such a layout also allows locations to be identified as training rather than operational garrisons.

许多训练基地并没有提供明显的守备部队，似乎暗示是由前来受训的部队自己负责安全警戒。这种情况并不能说明发射人员在自己的驻地就不进行训练了，而是展现了一种在二炮系统内能够进行战场部署和发射训练的能力。这种提供专门训练基地的训练方式也同样出现在中国人民解放军空军的地对空导弹部队。这样一种安排同样可以明确在某地展开行动的是一支受训部队而不是作战部队。

A representative training facility can be found at Linyi. This facility houses numerous training launch pads and minimal support facilities. It can be seen in the image below:

临猗是一个有代表性的训练基地。该基地具有若干个训练用发射平台和少量保障设施。如下图所示：

Two of the training facilities provide crew training on the DF-5A missile system. These two facilities, at Dongkou and Luoyang, are fitted with missile silos to provide a realistic training environment. Not only are crews theoretically able to undergo certification or training on launch procedures, but the presence of realistic silos allows maintenance personnel to effectively train on operational tasks such as silo reloading and in-silo missile servicing. This is a significant training capability to possess; with DF-5A ICBM silos in relatively short supply, training can be conducted without affecting the operational status of the primary Chinese strategic deterrent force.

有两个训练基地提供对东风-5A导弹系统发射人员的训练。这两个配备了导弹发射井用于提供真实训练环境的训练基地分别位于洞口和洛阳。不仅人员的理论教学和发射程序训练可以在这里进行，真实发射井的出现还可以让维护人员有效地进行发射井再装填和井内导弹勤务等作战任务的训练。这是一个需要特别指出的重要训练功能；由于东风-5A洲际弹道导弹的发射井数量相对较少，这种训练可以在不影响中国主要战略威慑力量作战状态的前提下进行。

TEST FACILITIES

测试基地

Seven test facilities support the development and testing of ballistic missiles in China. Six of these locations are equipped with facilities to launch various types of ballistic missiles. The seventh facility is an impact range equipped with mock targets used to assess missile accuracy. The locations and identifications of the 2nd Artillery Corps' test facilities can be seen in the image below:

有七个测试基地负责中国弹道导弹的研制与测试。其中六个装备了可以发射不同型号弹道导弹的设施。第七个基地是一个弹着点目标区，通过使用模拟目标来测试导弹的精度。已知的二炮测试基地的位置如下图所示：

The two primary ballistic missile test facilities are at Wuzhai and Shuangchengzi. These facilities contain multiple launch positions and support facilities, allowing for large-scale development programs to be conducted at each site. Wuzhai is considerably larger and is likely the primary ICBM test facility. It is the only test facility to be outfitted with a DF-5 series silo for trials launches, and has been cited in the open press as the launch site for DF-31 and DF-31A trials. Shuangchengzi, therefore, is likely primarily tasked with supporting SRBM/MRBM/IRBM development programs, although there is no reason why any type of missile could not be fired from either location.

两个主要的弹道导弹测试基地分别为五寨和双城子。这两个测试基地具有多个发射阵地和支援设施，可以在每个发射阵地进行大规模的研发项目 。五寨的规模相对较大，很可能是主要的洲际弹道导弹测试基地。该基地是唯一一个具有全套东风-5系列发射井可以用于试验发射的测试基地，并且曾经在公开出版的刊物上因为东风-31和东风-31A的发射试验得到过表彰。相对而言，双城子的主要任务是配合近程、中程和中远程研发项目，尽管没有任何的理由可以解释为什么不可以这两个测试基地之外发射任意一种型号的导弹。

Four other facilities, located at Bayan Hot, Huludao, Jinzhou, and Songlin, are also available for test launches. The Songlin site is noteworthy as it supports the development of China's ASAT missile. This location fired the SC-19 ASAT weapon used to destroy an orbiting satellite in January of 2007.

其它四个测试基地，分别位于巴彦浩特，葫芦岛，锦州，以及西昌，也可以进行测试发射。西昌发射场由于是配合中国反卫星导弹的研制而值得特别关注。该发射场曾经于2007年的1月发射SC-19型反卫星导弹摧毁了一枚在轨卫星。

Apart from the six launch facilities supporting missile testing, an impact zone located 100km northwest of Dunhuang provides targets for weapons fired in test and training launches. Close examination of this facility proves to be very revealing. The facility consists of five primary targets, seen in the image below. These targets consist of three mock airstrips and two concrete pads.

除了上述6个发射基地用于导弹测试之外，位于敦煌以北100公里处的一个弹着点目标区被做为导弹测试及训练发射的目标。细心检查这一基地可以发现很多东西。该基地由5个主要目标组成，如下图所示。这些目标分别由三条模拟机场跑道和两个水泥平台组成。

The concrete pads provide a great deal of insight into Chinese warhead development. Both the small western pad, measuring 115 meters by 115 meters, and the large eastern pad, measuring 250 meters by 250 meters, show considerable evidence of submunitions impacts, implying that submunitions warheads have been actively tested. The eastern pad was untouched as of May 2005, but began to show evidence of submunitions impacts in September 2006 imagery. By March of 2007 the eastern pad showed evidence of large HE warhead strikes.

这两个水泥平台可以大量揭示中国弹头的发展情报。位于西面的小平台尺寸为长、宽各115米，位于东面的大平台尺寸为长、宽各250米，这两个平台上都有相当多的弹头爆炸痕迹，表明曾经进行过弹头的装药测试。东平台在2005年5月时还没有命中的痕迹，但在2006年9月的照片上就开始出现了爆炸痕迹。到了2007年的3月东平台有了高爆弹头打击的痕迹。

The eastern pad is significant as it is divided into four 150 meter by 150 meter sections, allowing for missile accuracy to be measured accurately. All of the HE warhead impacts are contained within the northeastern section. The characteristics of the impacts themselves suggests that they were all made by the same type of warhead. While it is possible that this represents evidence of an MRV-equipped missile test, possibly that of the DF-21C, it cannot be conclusively determined if the impacts were made during the same test using the available imagery. As the weapons all impacted in the same segment of the pad, it does allow for an assessment of the accuracy of the launch platform. to be made.

东平台的重要之处在于它被分成了4个150米见方的矩形区域，可以对导弹的精度进行精确测量。所有高爆弹头的炸点都位于东北方格内。这一现象本身表明它们都是被同样一种类型的弹头命中的。由于这也有可能是一次多弹头导弹测试后留下的痕迹，比如可能是东风-21C，现有的照片资料尚不能肯定这是否是在同一次试验之后造成的结果。考虑到所有的命中痕迹都位于平台的同一区块，这确实可以对发射平台的精度进行有效的评估。

Details of the eastern impact pad can be seen in the image below:

东平台的弹头命中情况如下图所示：

All of the impacts can be contained within a circle having a 100 meter radius. This indicates that the CEP of the weapon is approximately 50 meters. Given the fact that the target site is 580 kilometers from Shuangchengzi, it is possible that a DF-15C test series resulted in the HE impacts on the pad. The DF-15C is reported to have a 600 kilometer range and terminal homing. The inclusion of a dual GPS and active radar terminal homing system on the DF-15C allows for an accuracy reportedly between 30 and 50 meters CEP, matching what is visible at the impact site. The integration of terminal homing with conventional warheads of high accuracy provides more credibility to the Chinese ASBM threat as well as indicating that accuracte, conventionally armed ballistic missiles may be more likely to be employed in a conflict than previous nuclear-only weapons. In a conventional conflict this could result in a significant increase in the number of ballistic missiles fired at targets, potentially allowing any ATBM or ABM systems in the area to be oversaturated.

所有的弹着点可以囊括在一个半径为100米的圆圈之内。这表明这些武器的圆概率误差接近50米级。假设其发射阵地是位于580公里外的双城子，那么平台上的高爆痕迹就有可能是东风-15C的一系列测试造成的。东风-15C据称具有600公里的射程和末端制导能力。综合了GPS和主动雷达末端制导双重引导系统的东风-15C，其命中精度可以达到30米至50米之间的圆概率误差。常规弹头结合高精度的末端制导技术除了让中国的反舰弹道导弹威胁更为可靠之外，这种高精度的常规弹头弹道导弹还比之前的核弹头导弹更有可能在冲突中使用。在传统冲突当中这还将导致弹道导弹对目标发射数量的明显增多，以便让目标区的任何反战术弹道导弹或者反弹道导弹系统进入饱合状态。

DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

研制与生产

The development and production of ballistic and cruise missiles in China involves numerous different facilities throughout the nation. These facilities can be seen in the image below:

中国寻访弹道导弹和巡航导弹的研制与生产涉及到遍布全国的不同基地。这些基地如下图所示：

Missile final assembly is conducted at one of the missile plants or assembly facilities. Solid propellant motors are produced by the facilities near Xian, with the Lantian Solid Rocket Motor Academy being responsible for their design and development. The Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology is responsible for liquid propellant motors, and the marked "Ballistic Missile Development Facility" may be CALT's main test facility, although this has yet to be verified. TELs are produced by three factories, and may be produced at the Beijing Nanyuan facility as well.

导弹的最终组装在一个导弹工厂或者组装基地进行。固体推进剂发动机由西安附近的基地生产，该基地进行设计研制的机构被称为蓝田固体火箭发动机研究所。中国运载火箭技术研究院负责液态推进发动机的研制，“弹道导弹研发基地”可能是中国运载火箭技术研究院主要的测试基地，但这一点尚未得到证实。运输发射车由三个工厂生产，北京南苑基地也有可能在生产。

NUCLEAR WEAPONS INDUSTRY

核武器工业

Little is known about the actual design and production of Chinese nuclear weapons. Five facilities have been identified that have a known nuclear-related purpose. They are as follows:
 

外界对于中国核武器设计及生产的准确情况知之甚少。现在只知道有5个地方与核有关。具体如下：

-CIAE Nuclear Research Complex, Tuoli
-404 Plutonium Production Plant, Jiuquan
-504 Uranium Gasseous Diffusion Plant, Lanzhou
-821 Plutonium Production Plant, Guangyuan
-Lop Nur Nuclear Test Site
 

-中国原子能科学研究院的核能研究所，坨里
-404钚工厂，酒泉
-504铀气态扩散工厂，兰州
-821钚工厂，广元
-罗布泊核试验场

These facilities are annotated on the image below:

上述单位的位置如下图所示：

While these facilities may have civillian nuclear power and research purposes, their nature indicates that they may also serve the Chinese nuclear weapons industry. Lop Nur is well known as the test site for Chinese nuclear weapons, and the three plants annotated above could be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material.

尽管上述单位可能具有民用核能与研究的目的，但是它们研究对象的本身说明了他们也可能在为中国的核武器工业服务。罗布泊是著名的中国核武器试验场，被标注出来的三个工厂也可以用于生产武器级别的核裂变原料。

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

作战部署

During wartime, control over the 2nd Artillery Corps' missile brigades differs as to their payload. Units fielding nuclear armed weapons, most notably the ICBM brigades, report directly to the Chinese national command center west of Beijing. Conventionally armed brigades are treated differently. A regional command cell, called a "war front" command, would assume control of relevant conventionally-armed ballistic missile units as part of a conventional missile corps. This missile corps would be subordinate to the war front command, acting as part of a total force package consisting of air, land, sea, and missile elements. Beijing's leadership and 2nd Artillery Corps commanders would be able to communicate directly with the war front command, and would retain the ability to directly control assigned missile brigades should the need arise or the situation warrant it. At the brigade level, individual firing battalions would be assigned operating areas consisting of presurveyed and/or prepared launch positions.

在战争期间，二炮部队各个导弹旅的控制管理根据其弹头载荷的类型而有所不同。那些装备核弹头的导弹旅，特别是装备洲际弹道导弹的导弹旅，直接由位于北京西郊的中国国家指挥中心指挥。常规弹头的导弹旅则有所区别。一个相当于传统意义上导弹军的被称为“前指”的区域指挥单元将承担起对常规弹头弹道导弹部队的指挥。这个导弹军将归属于战时前线司令部，这个司令部将统一指挥由陆、海、空及导弹部队组成的武装力量。北京的领导层和二炮指挥官都可以直接与战时前线司令部直接联系，并且也保留了在需要介入或者形势紧急的情况下直接控制指定导弹旅的能力。在导弹旅这个级别上，每个发射营都会被分配由预先测定和/或预先准备好的发射阵地组成的作战区域。

As previously mentioned, it is likely that the garrisoned TELs are not kept uploaded with missiles and armed with warheads. Inside a missile brigade's force structure, there are six departments: headquarters, political, logistics, technical and equipment, missile storage, and launch battalions. These are present in both conventional and nuclear missile brigades. The missile storage department consists of a central depot, and a missile/warhead transfer section. This implies that there is a storage facility for the missiles and warheads, or perhaps separate facilities for each. No garrison facility possesses the secure, hardened facilities needed to adequately store and protect these assets, so it must be assumed that they are located off-site. The logical assumption is that the vast network of UGFs located near the missile garrisons and launch sites are used to protect, store, and transfer these items. Storing warheads and missiles in UGFs allows TELs to be loaded and armed under protected cover, and away from the prying eyes of intelligence satellites attempting to gauge force readiness. This also allows the garrisons themselves to be situated in or near large population centers, as most of them are, without fear of any accident or incident leading to a catastrophe.

正如前面提到过的，很有可能导弹部队的运输发射车平时是不携带导弹和装载弹头的。对于一个导弹旅的内部组织结构来说，共由6个部门组成：旅指挥部，政治部，后勤部门，技术装备部门，以及导弹存贮部门，发射营。无论是常规导弹旅还是核导弹旅都是如此。导弹存贮部门由一个中心仓库，以及一个导弹/弹头转运部门组成。这意味着导弹和弹头有一个存贮设施，或者可能是分别加以存放。导弹部队的营房没有足够安全、坚固的场所可以用来妥善存贮和保护这些东西，因此，完全可以假定它们位于其它地方。一个理所当然的假设就是，位于导弹部队驻地附近的大量形成网络的地下工事和发射阵地就是用来保护、存贮、以及转运这些东西的。在地下工事存贮弹头和导弹可以让运输发射车在有掩护的情况下进行装载和弹头装配，并且躲过试图监视部队战备状态的侦察卫星的眼睛。这样做还可以把导弹部队安置在人口聚集区或者附近——事实上他们也大多是这样做的，而不用担心因为任何的意外或者事故导致重大灾难。

Apart from the ICBM force, which at present only provides a token deterrent lacking in any sort of credible counterforce or counterstrike capability, the 2nd Artillery Corps is equipped primarily for a regional mission. The most significant unit is the 52nd Base, controlling the weapons directed across the strait at the Taiwan Authority on the island of Taiwan. The twelve units of the 52nd Base control a large number of DF-3A, DF-11, DF-11A, DF-15, and DF-15C ballistic missiles. Apart from the DF-3A which can range far out into the Pacific Ocean, the remaining missile forces have sufficient range to blanket the island of Taiwan without venturing far from their garrisons.

与当前只具备象征性意义的、缺乏对任何波次的进攻进行可靠反击或者突击的洲际弹道导弹部队相比，二炮的装备主要是针对战区任务。其中最为突出的就是52基地，该基地控制着直接针对海峡对面台湾岛上台湾当局的导弹武器。52基地的12支部队装备了大量的东风-3A、东风-11、东风-11A、东风-15、以及东风-15C型弹道导弹。除了东风-3A的射程可以深入到太平洋以外，其余导弹部队都可以在不需要冒险远离其驻地的情况下有足够的射程对台湾岛进行瞄准。

The following image depicts 2nd Artillery Corps ballistic missile coverage of the island of Taiwan. DF-11 range rings are orange, DF-11A range rings are yellow, and DF-15/DF-15C range rings are red.

下图展示了第二炮兵弹道导弹对台湾岛的覆盖情况。东风-11的射程以橙色圈标示，东风-11A的射程以黄色标示，东风-15/东风-15C的射程则以红色圈表示。

With a limited ATBM capability provided by Tien Kung II, Tien Kung III, and PATRIOT PAC-2 SAM batteries, the island of Taiwan could easily be oversaturated by incoming weapons, even considering the October 2008 approval by the United States Congress of a PAC-3 sale to the Taiwan Authority. The deployment of accurate, conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles makes the missile threat to the island of Taiwan far more likely to become part of a military option. In short, a determined missile strike on the island of Taiwan can be carried out in a manner guaranteeing its success, should the Chinese government wish to expend the number of weapons necessary to oversaturate the ATBM capable systems. Given the number of missiles deployed by the 52nd Base, it would appear that at least part of that equation has already been satisfied.

由于天弓II型、III型以及爱国者PAC-2地对空导弹营只具备了有限的反战术弹道导弹的能力，即便是在考虑了2008年10月美国国会批准向台湾当局出售PAC-3型爱国者导弹的情况下，台湾岛也可以轻松地被来袭导弹的饱合攻击突破。部署可精确制导、携带常规弹头的弹道导弹和巡航导弹以形成对台湾岛的导弹威胁，正越来越可能成为一个军事选择。简而言之，在可以保证其成功性的前提下对台湾岛实施导弹攻击的决定就有可能被作出，这样一来中国政府就会希望扩充导弹的数量，以形成必要的对反战术弹道导弹系统的饱合攻击能力。考虑到52基地部署的导弹部队的数量，看起来至少对于这种方案中的一部分是认可的。

The most important feature of the 2nd Artillery Corps is mobility. A great deal of effort was made during the 1970s and 1980s to improve mobility and reduce the readiness time of deployed systems. Developmental systems which reached maturity in the 1990s and 2000s were all designed to be highly mobile; a great deal of the successes in this regard have stemmed from the maturation of the solid rocket motor industry.

二炮部队最为重要的一个能力就是机动性。上世纪70年代到80年代二炮部队为了提升机动能力做出了大量的努力，并且减少了部署系统的准备时间。新研制的系统于上世纪90年代到新世纪的头几年间发展成熟，设计上全都考虑了高机动性能；在这一方面所取得的成功，很大程度上要归功于固体火箭发动机工业的发展成熟。

Mobility enhances the survivability of deployed assets, making it harder to accurately target them due to a potential lack of consistently accurate positioning data. The only issue with mobile systems is the need for accurate pretargeting position data to prepare the onboard guidance systems. Using presurveyed and prepared launch sites alleviates a portion of this problem, but provides enemy forces with locations to monitor for deployed missile systems. Adequate intelligence and indications and warning information must also be possessed in order to ensure that missiles are field deployed prior to the outbreak of armed conflict, lest the launchers be destroyed in-garrison before they have a chance to be loaded and deployed.

机动性增强了导弹部署时的生存能力，使其更难以在缺少其精确阵地数据的情况下被准确瞄准。有关机动系统的唯一问题就是需要把预设阵地的准确数据在弹上的制导系统当中准备好。通过预先测定和准备发射阵地，可以部分解决这个问题，但也会让敌军获悉这些地点以监视导弹系统的部署情况。必须保证充分的情报、迹象及预警信息，以便确保导弹部队在武装冲突爆发前进入部署状态，从而避免发射车在有机会装弹和部署之前在驻地被摧毁。

FUTURE FORCE DEVELOPMENT

未来部队发展

The current ICBM force in China represents a token strategic deterrent incapable of waging a nuclear counterforce or counterstrike campaign. While silo-based DF-5A missiles are survivable to a degree, silo positions can be located and targeted for preemptive strike should the need arise. China has taken measures toconceal these positions, but they can still be located through thorough imagery analysis.

当前中国洲际弹道导弹只是一支象征性的战略威慑力量，无力承担一次核反击或者核突击的战役任务。尽管发射井式的东风-5A导弹生存能力会更强一点，发射井阵地也可能会被确定并成为首先打击的目标。中国已经采取措施来隐藏这些发射阵地，但它们在全面彻底的图像分析面前也会暴露。

To increase survivability and reduce launch preparation time, the solid propellant DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs have been developed and are being fielded. Liquid-fueled DF-5A missiles may not employ storable liquid fuel propellant, possibly requiring a lengthy fueling process before firing.

为了提升生存能力并减少发射的准备时间，固体燃料推进的东风-31和东风-31A公路机动洲际弹道导弹已经被研制出来并装备部队。液态燃料的东风-5A导弹不能使用可存贮的液态燃料推进剂，在发射前可能需要有更长的燃料处理时间。

The DF-31 appears to have been superceded by the longer-ranged DF-31A capable of reaching the entire United States, with only the 813th Brigade at Nanyang and possibly the unidentified brigade at Xixia definitely operating the system. The main drawback of the DF-31, apart from the shorter range when compared to the DF-31A, is the lack of an off-road capability. It is believed that a new off-road capable TEL is being developed for the DF-31A, allowing the weapons to be deployed further afield from garrisons in areas where launch positions would be much harder to identify.

东风-31看起来已经被射程更远的、射程可以覆盖整个美国的东风-31A所取代，只有南阳的813旅以及西峡的未知导弹旅可以肯定装备了这一导弹系统。与东风-31A相比除了射程短之外，东风-31的主要缺点在于缺少非公路的机动能力。可以相信东风-31A已经使用了新型的可以进行非公路机动的运输发射车，以便让这种导弹可以在驻地之外的更大范围内进行部署，这样一来发射阵地就更难以被发现了。

The deployment of increased numbers of DF-31 and DF-31A systems will finally allow China to obtain a survivable, credible counterforce and counterstrike capability. The presence of UGFs supporting these systems allows them to remain hidden prior to launch, perhaps deploying after an initial nuclear attack to perform. a counterstrike mission. MIRVing these weapons would increase the effectiveness of each launcher, and when combined with the PLAN's evolving SSBN fleet would allow a smaller number of launch platforms to serve as a counterforce option and credible deterrent to any nuclear strike, should a "launch on warning" posture be adopted with sufficient support assets.

东风-31和东风-31A导弹系统部署数量的增加将最终使中国获得一支具备高生存能力和可靠反击与突击能力的导弹部队。地下工事可以为这些系统提供支援，让它们在发射之前处于隐藏状态，在最初的核打击进行之后执行反击任务。这些导弹的分导式多弹头改装将增强每部发射车的作战效能，结合中国海军发展中的弹道导弹核潜艇，就可以实现在少量发射平台的情况下执行反击任务，并且在有足够资源配合的情况下摆出一个“发射警告”的姿态，可靠地威慑任何核攻击行为。

One mission being developed for the 2nd Artillery Corps is that of anti-carrier strike using precision-guided conventionally armed ballistic missiles. More information on these developments can be foundhere.

二炮部队的一个新任务就是使用精确制导的常规弹头弹道导弹执行反航母打击任务。更多有关这方面的相关信息请参阅此处。

CONCLUSION

总结

While the 2nd Artillery Corps does not currently represent a significant nuclear deterrent force against either the United States or Russia, it represents a very substantial threat to regional aggressors due to the large number of SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM assets currently deployed. As more mobile ICBMs are deployed and more accurate conventional theater weapons enter service, the 2nd Artillery Corps will evolve into a true strategic deterrent and even more devastating regional military force. Perhaps, if American pundits crying out over the Chinese military threat to the world are to be believed, the United States should not be so eager to rid itself of a nuclear deterrent after all.

尽管相对于美国或者是俄罗斯而言，第二炮兵当前并不是一支强大的核威慑力量，但对于局部入侵者而言，其当前部署的大量近程、中程和中远程弹道导弹还是一个非常重大的威胁。随着更多机动型洲际弹道导弹的部署和更为精确的常规弹头导弹的入役，第二炮兵将演变成为一支具备真正战略威慑能力和在战区级更具有毁灭能力的武装力量。也许，如果美国专家们所呐喊的中国对世界形成了军事威胁可以当真的话，美国就根本不应该对自己从核威慑中脱身表现出如此的热衷。