By Bryan Clark

Wednesday, Aug 23

作者：布莱恩·克拉克

2023年8月23日，星期三

 

The U.S. Navy ballistic missile submarine Tennessee and a British Royal Navy nuclear submarine, along with aircraft, conduct bilateral training. (Naval Aircrewman (Operator) 1st Class Aaron Abbott/U.S. Navy)

美国海军田纳西号弹道导弹潜艇和英国皇家海军核潜艇以及飞机进行双边训练。（海军一级飞行员（操作员）亚伦·阿伯特/美国海军）

 

China’s recent announcements of new submarine-hunting technologies are probably more hype than hardware, but they highlight Beijing’s goal of countering the threat posed by U.S. attack boats, which remain essential to U.S. war plans. The U.S. submarine force will not be able to rest on its laurels as the world’s finest for much longer. Soon it will need new approaches and capabilities to operate and potentially fight in the bastions that China and Russia consider their home waters.

中国最近宣布的新潜艇搜寻技术可能更多的是炒作，而不是硬件，但它们突显了北京对抗美国攻击艇威胁的目标，而美国攻击艇对美国的战争计划仍然至关重要。美国潜艇部队在很长一段时间内都无法安于现状，成为世界上最优秀的潜艇部队。很快，它将需要新的方法和能力来在中国和俄罗斯视为本国水域的堡垒中作战。

 

China has been trying to up its anti-submarine warfare game for more than a decade. Today, sonar arrays like the United States’ Cold War-ear Sound Surveillance System network listen in the East and South China seas as well as the waters U.S. submarines would need to transit from Guam or Hawaii. They are complemented by capable low-frequency active sonars on Type 056 Jingdao-class corvette that would obviate the superior sound silencing of U.S. submarines. Around the most protected areas, like the Taiwan Strait, Chinese forces are likely to deploy mines as well.

十多年来，中国一直在努力提高其反潜战水平。如今，像美国冷战时期的噪音监视系统网络这样的声纳阵列在中国东海和南海以及美国潜艇从关岛或夏威夷过境所需的水域进行监听。056型江岛级护卫舰上的低频有源声纳对它们进行了补充，这将避免美国潜艇优越的声音消音。在台湾海峡等最受保护的地区，中国军队也可能部署水雷。

 

Since the Cold War, the U.S. submarine force has relied on its stealth to surveil opponents and threaten denial or retaliation. When the primary targets of U.S. submarines were Soviet submarines in the far north or Soviet fleets in the open ocean, stealth was sufficient. After U.S. submarines launched attacks and could be detected, their targets were likely consumed with defense more than anti-submarine warfare.

自冷战以来，美国潜艇部队一直依靠其隐身能力监视对手，并威胁拒阻或报复。当美国潜艇的主要目标是遥远北方的苏联潜艇或公海的苏联舰队时，隐形就足够了。在美国潜艇发动攻击并被探测到后，它们的目标可能更多地被防御消耗，而不是反潜战。

 

Against China, and perhaps Russia, this dynamic no longer holds. U.S. submarines will likely need to launch missiles or torpedoes close to enemy coasts. While their targets may be tied up with defense, the rest of the enemy’s forces at sea and ashore can devote themselves to counterattacks. U.S. submarines could find themselves on the run after their initial salvos and unable to further contribute to the fight.

对抗中国，也许还有俄罗斯，这种动力不再存在。美国潜艇可能需要在敌方海岸附近发射导弹或鱼雷。虽然他们的目标可能与防御有关，但敌人在海上和岸上的其他部队可以投入反击。美国潜艇在最初的齐射后可能会发现自己在逃跑，无法进一步参与战斗。

 

To avoid being marginalized like hundreds of German U-boats late in World War II, U.S. submarines will need to suppress or confuse the sensors China or Russia will depend on for undersea detection and targeting. In many ways, they face the same challenge as aviators conducting strikes in the face of modern air defenses. And like their aerial counterparts, U.S. submarine forces will need to employ jamming, decoys, deception and destruction to break into contested areas undersea.

为了避免像二战后期数百艘德国U型潜艇那样被边缘化，美国潜艇将需要压制或混淆中国或俄罗斯海底探测和确定目标所依赖的传感器。在许多方面，他们面临着与面对现代防空系统进行打击的飞行员相同的挑战。与空中同行一样，美国潜艇部队将需要使用干扰、诱饵、欺骗和破坏手段来闯入海底有争议的区域。

 

Another challenge submariners will share with aviators is how to suppress or defeat enemy defenses without giving up strike capacity in the process. U.S. air forces in Vietnam, facing the first generation of Soviet surface-to-air missiles, had to divert about a third of their strike packages to countering North Vietnamese defenses even though the new SA-2 was only effective about 2% of the time.

潜艇艇员将与飞行员分享的另一个挑战是如何在不放弃打击能力的情况下压制或击败敌人的防御。面对苏联第一代地对空导弹，驻越南的美国空军不得不将大约三分之一的打击计划转移到对抗北越的防御上，尽管新型SA-2只有大约2%的机会有效。

 

Uncrewed vehicles would be the best choice for deploying the acoustic jammers, radar and sonar decoys, and explosive warheads that will suppress or defeat Chinese or Russian undersea sensors or mines. But to preserve the submarine’s weapons capacity and reduce its likelihood of detection, most of these vehicles should be launched by someone else.

无人运载器将是部署声学干扰器、雷达和声纳诱饵以及能够压制或击败中国或俄罗斯海底传感器或水雷的爆炸弹头的最佳选择。但为了保持潜艇的武器能力并降低其被探测的可能性，这些运载工具中的大多数应该由其他平台发射。

 

Confusing or attacking enemy sensors depends on accurate targeting, which the challenges of undersea sensing and communication will make nearly impossible in real time. Instead, U.S. undersea forces will need to survey adversary sensors and networks in advance. Large uncrewed undersea vehicles, like the Navy’s now-canceled Snakehead or the commercially available Remus 6000, could gather this intelligence, which may be impractical with smaller UUVs that may lack the necessary endurance or depth.

混淆或攻击敌方传感器取决于准确的目标定位，而海底传感和通信的挑战将使其几乎不可能实时定位。相反，美国海底部队将需要提前调查对手的传感器和网络。大型无人潜航器，如海军现已取消的“黑鱼”（Snakehead）或商用Remus 6000，可以收集这些情报，而对于可能缺乏必要续航力或深度的小型无人潜航器来说，这可能是不切实际的。

 

However, medium and small UUVs launched from shore, aircraft or unmarked ships would be well-suited to jamming and deception missions. Vehicles such as the in-development medium UUV or Lionfish small UUV could carry decoy systems like those on the Navy’s Expendable Mobile Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Target that emulates submarine tones to draw attention away from U.S. undersea operations. And to obscure both real and simulated submarine undersea activity, small or medium UUVs could carry noisemakers like those on existing active torpedo countermeasures.

然而，从岸上、飞机或无标记船只发射的中型和小型无人潜航器非常适合执行干扰和欺骗任务。开发中的中型无人潜航器或“狮鱼”小型无人潜航器等运载工具可以携带诱饵系统，就像海军的可消耗性机动反潜作战训练目标上的诱饵系统一样，该系统模仿潜艇音调，以吸引人们对美国海底作战的关注。为了掩盖真实和模拟的潜艇海底活动，小型或中型无人潜航器可以携带与现有主动鱼雷对抗装置类似的噪音制造器。

 

The confusion created in the enemy’s underwater picture by decoys, jamming and actual U.S. submarine operations would likely overwhelm the still relatively small anti-submarine warfare response capacity of Russia or China. However, U.S. submarines will need the ability to stand and fight when attacks come, rather than evade and regain their stealth. This will demand improved combat systems that can predict the effectiveness of an enemy attack and can guide new counter-torpedo weapons, much like the Aegis system and surface-to-air missiles do for surface combatants.

诱饵、干扰和美国潜艇的实际行动在敌人的水下图像中造成的混乱可能会压倒俄罗斯或中国仍然相对较小的反潜战反应能力。然而，美国潜艇将需要在攻击来临时具备站位和战斗的能力，而不是躲避并重新获得隐身能力。这将需要改进作战系统，能够预测敌人攻击的有效性，并能够制导新的反鱼雷武器，就像宙斯盾系统和地对空导弹为水面战斗人员所做的那样。

 

Once U.S. submarines reach the most contested areas where they are needed to launch missile attacks deep into enemy territory or stop ships invading an ally, they will still likely face the threat of undersea mines. This mission is where sub-launched and -recovered medium UUVs will be essential for finding a path around mines or — if necessary — destroying them.

一旦美国潜艇到达最具争议的地区，在那里它们需要向敌方领土深处发动导弹攻击或阻止船只入侵盟友，它们仍可能面临海底水雷的威胁。在这次任务中，潜艇发射和回收的中型无人潜航器对于找到绕过水雷的路径或在必要时摧毁水雷至关重要。

 

The changes these operational concepts imply will be substantial. Instead of being the silent service, the U.S. undersea force will need to generate noise and hide in the resulting chaos. And rather than being alone and unafraid, U.S. submariners will need to rely on a team of crewed and uncrewed platforms on, above and below the water to reach their targets. Otherwise, America’s world-leading submarine force could find itself viewing the action from the sideline.

这些操作概念所暗示的变化将是实质性的。美国海底部队不再需要沉默的服务，而是产生噪音，隐藏在由此产生的混乱中。并且美国潜艇船员将需要依靠一组有人和无人平台，在水面上下到达目标。否则，美国世界领先的潜艇部队可能会发现自己站在一旁观看行动。

 

Bryan Clark is a senior fellow and the director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute think tank.

布莱恩·克拉克（Bryan Clark）是哈德逊研究所智库国防概念与技术中心的高级研究员和主任。